War for the Future in Israel and Palestine
31/10/2023
Executive summary
With its attack on October 7th, Hamas intended to halt the peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as question Israel’s ability to provide security cooperation to Arab states that are normalizing their relations with the Jewish state. Hamas also aimed to regionalize the conflict by provoking a strong Israeli response in the Gaza Strip that would result in many deaths among the civilian population, thus inflaming public opinion in the Arab world. Additionally, Hamas intended to weaken the position of the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank.
The imminent ground offensive in Gaza, if confirmed, will likely result in a campaign that will last for months. This operation will cause many casualties among Israeli forces and thousands of civilian victims among the Palestinian population. However, it remains to be seen whether Israel will choose to maintain a military occupation in Gaza after the invasion, in the event that it succeeds in toppling the Hamas government. If Israel opts to relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian National Authority, Fatah, the party that controls this institution, may find itself in a difficult position, as it needs to maintain a delicate balance between the goal of preserving minimal Palestinian support for the authority and the need to cooperate with Israel in order to maintain its stability and financial viability.
The geopolitical consequences of the war are still unclear, and the possibility of a regional escalation is quite feasible. It is possible that Saudi Arabia will continue the normalization process with Israel even after the conflict ends, although Saudi public opinion, which is highly sensitive to the Palestinian cause, could potentially hinder this. This same scenario also applies to a large extent to Turkey, which also has regional leadership ambitions in the Middle East that make it difficult for Ankara to put the situation in Gaza on the back burner. As for Russia, it has benefited from the outbreak of the conflict due to the potential diversion of Western attention and resources from Ukraine to the Middle East. Given the growing alignment between Russia and Iran, it is not out of the question for Israel to refocus its policy towards Moscow and its position regarding the Ukrainian war. Finally, the EU will face difficulties in maintaining a stance that allows it to maintain sufficient credibility in the face of the Global South in a moment of high geopolitical competition in many of its regions.
Introduction
On October 7th, 2023, thousands of armed Hamas militants breached the Gaza security fence using tractors, RPGs, and explosives, infiltrating southern Israel. At the same time, Hamas launched a barrage of rockets from Gaza towards Israel. This was at least in part a result of a severe failure in Israeli intelligence, which is considered the most significant lapse since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, resulting in the loss of 1,300 Israeli civilians and the abduction of over 200 individuals. Additionally, Hamas briefly gained control of approximately 10 Israeli towns, where the majority of the killings and abductions took place. This dire situation has resulted in the declaration of a state of war, the mobilization of nearly 400,000 Israeli reservists, and heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces in preparation for a ground invasion. Consequently, the conflict has caused widespread damage to infrastructure and numerous civilian casualties, including several thousand Palestinians killed.
This article aims to provide an explanation of this crisis in three parts. Firstly, it will examine the historical background and recent geopolitical shifts that laid the foundation for the outbreak of this war. Secondly, it will delve into the objectives that Hamas aimed to achieve through this attack. And lastly, it will explore the prospects for the development of this conflict and its potential aftermath.
Road to the Sukkot War
The failure of the Oslo Peace Process and its aftermath
The possibility of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has reached an impasse since the failure of the Oslo peace process in 2000. During the 1990s, a significant pro-peace movement emerged in Israel, leading to the recognition of the legitimate representation of the Palestinian people in the form of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). This recognition resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the initial implementation of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords granted the PNA control over Gaza and designated areas of the West Bank, which are currently occupied by Israel but have not been officially annexed. The objective was to eventually establish a Palestinian state with control over Gaza and specific territories in the West Bank, to be exchanged with Israel through land swaps.
However, two major setbacks hindered the progress of this process. Firstly, Israeli society became deeply divided over the peace process and the Israeli Prime Minister who initiated it, Itzhak Rabin, was assassinated by a far-right militant. This event further aggravated tensions within Israel and significantly impacted the prospects for peace. Secondly, the Palestinian camp also faced internal divisions. There were those who refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist, primarily represented by Hamas. On the other hand, there were Palestinians who were more open to negotiation and compromise with Israel, represented by Fatah.
The Ehud Barak-led Israeli Labor government presented an offer centered around a two-state solution during the Camp David Summit in 2000. However, this offer sparked significant divisions within Israeli society, particularly among the majority of the right-wing camp, who vehemently opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state. The rationale behind this opposition lies in the deep-seated belief of the right-wing camp in Israel that the strategic relevance and inherent significance of retaining control over these territories are paramount. According to Israeli right-wing views, the continued presence in these areas is essential not only for security reasons but also through the historical and religious attachment that Israeli right-wing ideologies place on the entire traditional Land of Israel. The right-wing camp considers this attachment to these lands as an integral aspect of Jewish national identity and, as such, sees the retention of control over these territories as an imperative goal in itself. That is why the right-wing camp has always focused on the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, with the intention of implementing a strategy of faits accomplis and creating obstacles for the establishment of a Palestinian State in those territories.
On the other hand, the Palestinian National Authority, led by the secular organization Fatah and its prominent leader, Yasser Arafat, deemed that the offer by the Israeli government was unsatisfactory on multiple grounds. Firstly, Arafat considered it unacceptable that the agreement did not include the return to the current Israeli territory of the Palestinian refugees who lived there before 1948, the date of the establishment of the State of Israel, as well as their descendants. Furthermore, there was an underlying issue that posed problems for the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority to sign the agreement: a significant number of Palestinians believed that the areas that had already been part of the State of Israel since 1948 belonged legitimately to the Palestinian people, and it was not permissible to relinquish them. This fundamental disagreement on the territorial issue and the legitimacy of the Jewish state greatly complicated the negotiations.
Furthermore, Fatah faced a delicate and precarious situation regarding its competition with the Islamist organization Hamas. Accepting the proposed peace agreement would not only have required compromise but also required Fatah to navigate the resistance and opposition from within its own society. A substantial part of Palestinian public opinion did not recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish State on what they perceived as Palestinian land. This created a potential vulnerability for Fatah, as accepting the peace agreement could have resulted in accusations of betrayal and weakened its standing against Hamas.
Unilateral disengagement
The failure of the Oslo peace process led to the Second Intifada (2000-2005) among Palestinians, resulting in the loss of hope by the majority of Israeli society, including the left-wing camp, in the possibility of achieving a two-state solution for peace with the Palestinians. This was evident in the 2001 election when the Labor Party was defeated, and Likud candidate Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister. During his tenure, Sharon pursued a strategy of “unilateral disengagement” in response to the lack of willingness from the Palestinian side to recognize the existence of a Jewish state. Sharon advocated for a withdrawal from occupied territories that did not include significant Israeli settlement blocs, as these areas would not be part of any future peace agreement with the Palestinians.
This approach aimed to address demographic concerns, as the overall territory controlled by Israel, including both proper territories and occupied territories, had only around 50% Jewish population at that time. By withdrawing from certain areas, Sharon sought to ensure the maintenance of a Jewish majority in the areas under Israeli control. Additionally, Sharon believed that Palestinians aimed to shift the focus of the conflict from an anti-occupation struggle to a fight for equal rights within a single state, similar to the situation in South Africa during the Apartheid era. According to Sharon, this pursuit of a one-state solution presented a significant challenge to the existence of a Jewish state. In his view, while a one-state solution may seem more appealing to the international community, the demographic reality of the whole Land of Israel meant that if Jews were no longer the majority, it would mean the end of the Jewish state. Furthermore, Sharon believed that if Israel were to persist in prolonged occupation over predominantly Palestinian-inhabited territories, there would be a substantial risk of severe deterioration in the international image and support for the Jewish State.
The disengagement strategy of Sharon encountered two main obstacles. The first obstacle was opposition from within the Likud party, stemming from the aforementioned strong ideological principles held by the right-wing camp, which emphasizes the importance of controlling the entire “Land of Israel.” This opposition was led by Benjamin Netanyahu and eventually led to the split of Sharon and his allies from Likud, forming a new party called Kadima, in order to advance with the disengagement strategy. The second problem arose after the implementation of the plan. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the Palestinian National Authority assumed control over the Gaza Strip, with the exception of borders, airspace, and territorial waters. Additionally, Israel dismantled four settlements in a small part of the West Bank. However, the withdrawal resulted in significant challenges. Subsequent elections within the Palestinian National Authority were won by Hamas, which led to severe infighting between Hamas and Fatah, without any progress towards resolution or reconciliation. This conflict escalated, with both factions engaging in attacks against each other. The situation reached its peak in June 2007 with Hamas taking control of the Gaza Strip, while the Fatah-controlled PNA kept controlling the West Bank.
Managing the conflict without an end in sight
This scenario led Hamas and other Gaza-based militias to periodically shell Israeli territory, resulting in subsequent Israeli retaliations, military operations, and the blockade of the Gaza Strip in coordination with Egypt. These events led Israel to conclude that the unilateral disengagement strategy would not be effective in future withdrawals from the West Bank. The fear was that such withdrawals could lead to a similar situation, but in a territory that was more strategically located due to its proximity to central Israel, where the majority of the Israeli population resides, and a mountainous terrain that offers a critical strategic advantage over the Israeli central coastal plain. With Benjamin Netanyahu’s election in 2009, Israeli strategy shifted towards managing the occupation without a foreseeable end in the near or middle term, abandoning expectations of signing an acceptable peace agreement with the Palestinian leadership. However, Israel continued to collaborate with the Fatah-controlled Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in order to prevent its collapse and a potential takeover of the West Bank by Hamas.
However, the fact that achieving a peace agreement with the Palestinians did not seem plausible did not deter Netanyahu from considering the possibility of establishing peace with other Arab states. As we explained in an article published in 2021, a long-standing right-wing belief in Israel, which emerged in the 1930s under the influence of revisionist thinker Ze’ev Jabotinsky, is that by successfully defending the Jewish state against attacks from its neighbors over time, the surrounding Arab states would eventually realize that reclaiming Arab rule in Palestine would be impossible. Instead, they would recognize the advantages of accepting and cooperating with Israel, as Egypt did in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 after engaging in multiple wars with Israel. In this regard, Netanyahu saw an opportunity for cooperation with certain Sunni Arab states that shared concerns about the growing influence of Iran. These states recognized that Israel could provide critical security cooperation in addressing these security concerns. However, they also grew increasingly disillusioned with the Palestinian issue due to the perceived lack of strategy from the Palestinian leadership and the potential benefits in terms of security and economic cooperation with Israel. After years of cultivating informal relations with these countries, Israel was able to achieve peace agreements with several of them, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. However, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia, the leader of this regional block, had not entered a formal normalization agreement with Israel, despite years of informal security cooperation between the two countries.
Consequently, the Israeli strategy shifted its focus towards achieving a peace and normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. Negotiations regarding the details of this agreement were underway in the days leading up to the Hamas attack on 7th October 2023. Despite the presence of several highly sensitive issues, such as Saudi requisites for further Palestinian National Authority (PNA) control in the West Bank and Israeli acceptance of the development of a Saudi civil nuclear program, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman expressed optimism about the possibilities of reaching an agreement with Israel. This geopolitical scenario held significant implications for the Palestinian leadership, including both the Fatah-controlled PNA and Hamas, as it would potentially result in an increasing isolation of the Palestinian cause among the Sunni Arab bloc, led by Saudi Arabia. In line with the aforementioned Jabotinsky strategy, Israel hoped that by further isolating the Palestinians regionally, it could continue managing the occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza without a foreseeable political agreement with the Palestinian leadership in the short or middle term.
The October 7th attack and the goals of Hamas
It is in the context of the aforementioned geopolitical scenario and Iran’s efforts to disrupt security cooperation between Israel and the Sunni Arab block that it is important to analyze the Hamas attacks on civilian populations near the Gaza Strip on October 7th. These attacks resulted in the killing and kidnapping of hundreds of Israelis. What were Hamas’s objectives?
Undermining the Israeli-Saudi normalization process and the Abraham Accords
Primarily, Hamas aimed to obstruct the peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as undermine other agreements signed by Sunni Arab countries, by exploiting the vulnerability of their public opinions. The populations of these countries were hesitant to accept the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in territories they considered to be part of the Arab and Islamic world. Hamas sought to incite public opinion against these agreements in those countries. To achieve this, Hamas orchestrated brutal killings and kidnappings of as many Israeli civilians as possible, with the explicit goal of provoking an Israeli ground invasion of Gaza. Anticipating the densely populated urban landscape of the Gaza Strip and the vigorous Israeli military response from both the air and ground, Hamas expected that such an operation would result in the deaths of thousands of Gazans and widespread destruction. Consequently, it is quite likely that Hamas aimed to use this humanitarian crisis to further inflame public opinion in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab countries. The ultimate objective would be to pressure the Saudi government to halt the normalization process with Israel, thereby effectively disrupting ongoing talks.
However, Hamas also aimed to undermine the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-led Sunni Arab bloc with Israel by questioning Israel’s reliability as a security partner capable of providing critical security guarantees within the context of the Cold War between the Sunni Arab bloc and Iran. This operation was carried out due to a historic intelligence failure on the part of Israel, which failed to anticipate Hamas’s planned incursion into Israeli territory. This resulted in the defensive line of the Gaza border having few troops and very limited artillery resources to face the attack of Hamas. Israeli intelligence services are globally recognized for their reliability, and this factor played a significant role in Arab states concluding that normalizing relations with Israel was more advantageous than continuing to deny its legitimate existence. Through its attack, Hamas sought to demonstrate that Israel is not as strong as it presents itself to be, aiming to sow doubts among Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states regarding the prospects of security cooperation with Israel.
Furthermore, Hamas aimed to send a clear message to Saudi Arabia and the states that have signed peace agreements with Israel. This message conveyed that while the strategy advocated by Jabotinsky, which involved getting the Arab states to accept Israel’s existence through successfully resisting attacks and making them lose faith in their capacity to regain control of Palestine, may have worked with these states, the Palestinians will never accept Israel and will never relinquish their land. Moreover, Hamas sought to emphasize that without a solution to the Palestinian issue, lasting peace in the Middle East would remain elusive. They argued that all security and geoeconomic projects designed around the normalization agreements with Israel, such as the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor, would be impossible to implement without addressing the situation of the Palestinians
Destabilizing the West Bank and weakening the position of the PNA
Over the last several years, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has pursued a strategy of pragmatic security cooperation with Israeli authorities to contain Hamas in the West Bank and maintain control over the territories under PA jurisdiction. This approach involves collaborating with Israeli security forces to prevent Hamas from gaining significant influence in the West Bank, thereby safeguarding regional stability. Simultaneously, the Palestinian Authority pursues a broader strategy aimed at questioning the democratic nature of Israel due to its prolonged occupation of the West Bank to generate international support and exert pressure on Israel to move towards ending the occupation. Through the maintenance of security cooperation with Israel, while simultaneously questioning the democratic legitimacy of Israeli actions in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has been seeking to strike a delicate balance between containing Hamas and maintaining stability in the West Bank, while also mobilizing increased international intervention in support of Palestinian statehood and the cessation of the Israeli occupation.
Hamas’ attacks are aimed at undermining the aforementioned strategy by suggesting that active rejection of Israel and direct attacks against the Jewish state can lead to progress for the Palestinian people. Additionally, they aim to portray the PA as a corrupt entity that collaborates with Israel for its own interests and privileges, disregarding the welfare of the Palestinians. This objective has seen some success, as Hamas has been able to provoke several mobilizations in the West Bank against the PA. The ultimate goal is to significantly increase these mobilizations to the point where a potential Hamas takeover of the West Bank becomes possible at some point.
It should be noted that another goal related to this strategy was to mobilize Palestinians living within the State of Israel who hold Israeli citizenship, commonly referred to as “Israeli Arabs.” They constitute approximately 20% of the Israeli population, with the aim of encouraging them to participate in hostile actions against Israel within its own borders. However, Hamas has not yet succeeded in achieving this objective. This could be attributed to the fact that at least eighteen Israeli Arabs were among those killed in the attacks on October 7th and that the rocket attacks against Israeli territory are also impacting areas inhabited by Israeli Arabs.
Regionalizing the conflict by involving Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies
Hamas not only seeks to undermine the normalization process between Israel and Sunni Arab states but also to actively involve Shia Arab actors who oppose the existence of Israel and have strong ties to Iran, the other major regional power in the Middle East that openly aims to annihilate Israel. Indeed, it is difficult not to suspect that Iran has been actively involved in planning these operations, given the sophisticated training displayed by Hamas militants and the large supply of rockets provided to the organization for regular strikes on Israel.
However, it is important to bear in mind that Hamas is not a pure Iranian proxy, insofar that it is a Sunni Arab Islamist movement with strong links to other supportive states like Turkey and Qatar, through its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ political bureau is based in Qatar and the country has provided crucial financial aid to help sustain Hamas’ administrative structure in Gaza, while Turkey not only refuses to categorize Hamas as a terrorist organization but also actively supports it, especially since Hamas assumed control of the Gaza Strip. This support was evident when an Israeli attack targeted a Turkish vessel carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza in 2010 after it refused to alter its course in Gazan waters. However, in the last two years, Hamas has increasingly relied on Iran due to the resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey in 2022 and the improving relations between Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Countries, led by Saudi Arabia, which had imposed a blockade on Qatar between 2017 and 2021. Keeping these factors in mind, it is possible that Hamas’ plans had Iran’s knowledge and approval, as well as a plan to potentially involve its proxies in the operation and thus regionalize the conflict.
Hamas aims to involve Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite Islamist organization formed in 1982, as its main Iranian proxy in the current conflict. Hezbollah emerged to confront the Israeli invasion of Lebanon intended to expel the PLO from the country and force regime change in Beirut. It is notable for its well-trained armed faction, which has demonstrated the capability to execute complex military operations reminiscent of a regular army. This was exemplified during its involvement in critical moments of the civil war in Syria. Consequently, should Hezbollah initiate a military front in northern Israel that compels the Israel Defense Forces to divide their attention between Gaza and the northern border, this would be highly advantageous for Hamas. Such a scenario would place additional pressure on Israeli forces and potentially divert resources away from the conflict in Gaza, providing a tactical advantage to Hamas.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah faces a significant political and economic challenge. Lebanon is currently in the midst of a deep financial crisis and dysfunctional governance, which has resulted in a complicated social situation that is difficult to manage. Launching an all-out attack and incursion against Israel could lead to an overwhelmingly strong retaliation from the Israeli side, potentially surpassing the destruction witnessed during the Second Lebanon War in 2006 when entire neighborhoods and settlements were devastated by aerial attacks. This scenario is particularly delicate today, as Lebanon finds itself in a dire financial, social, and political condition unlike any since the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990). Furthermore, Lebanon is a country deeply divided along religious sectarian lines, with Shiite, Sunni, and Maronite communities. This adds further complexity to the prospects of a full-scale attack on Israel, as Hezbollah cannot assume that the Sunni and Maronite factions will support its intervention if it risks provoking a heavy Israeli retaliation that worsens the country’s current plight. Instead, there is a possibility that such an attack may trigger hostile actions towards Hezbollah and even instigate a civil war-like spiral, depending on how the situation unfolds. Due to these factors, Hezbollah has so far limited itself to launching rockets against Israel without initiating a full-scale attack.
Future prospects
Israel will likely initiate a ground operation against Hamas in Gaza in the upcoming days
Unless a return of the Israeli hostages from Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces are expected to initiate an all-out invasion of the Gaza Strip in response to the attacks that occurred on October 7th, as they no longer find it tolerable to allow Hamas to maintain control over the area. In the past, the idea of removing Hamas from Gaza was deemed infeasible due to the potential high civilian casualties in a densely populated urban environment, as well as the expected international condemnation and the severe casualties that Israeli forces would face in close-quarters combat against Hamas’s prepared tunnels and ambush tactics. However, the October 7th attack has altered the perspective, leading some to believe that the potential cost of invading Gaza is now justifiable.
Nevertheless, if Israel were to succeed in ousting Hamas from the Gaza Strip through a lengthy and complex military operation, the question arises as to what the political goals for the aftermath of the invasion would be. It is improbable that full Israeli occupation is viable since Israel is not interested in assuming responsibility for a larger Palestinian population than it currently does, while population displacement from the Gaza Strip, beyond the international outcry that it would generate, is not possible because of the refusal from Egypt -which sees Hamas as a primary national security threat due to its links to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood- and other Arab countries to accept Palestinian refugees in their territories.
Therefore, the reestablishment of PNA control over Gaza appears to be a more strategically sensible option for the post-invasion scenario, but it remains unclear to what extent Israel has a clear vision for navigating the aftermath of the conflict in Gaza or has a plan to halt the operation if it becomes infeasible at some point. In this regard, the operational challenges of a prolonged dense urban operation in Gaza are likely to result in high Israeli casualties, leading to doubts about the Israeli public’s ability to sustain the costs of the war in the long run. Additionally, even if the highest standards of International Humanitarian Law were applied, there would still be massive civilian deaths among Palestinians, which could increase international pressure to halt the full-scale invasion as the war drags on, even from those states that are closer to Israel.
The Palestinian National Authority will face difficult choices in the aftermath of the Gaza invasion
The prospect of reclaiming control of the Gaza Strip through cooperation with Israel may become challenging if the level of destruction and civilian casualties in Gaza is so severe that Fatah is perceived as betraying its followers by aligning with Israel. However, Fatah may find itself with limited alternatives if such an option is offered to it. Over the past two years, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has struggled to maintain full control of the West Bank, dealing with an intensifying insurgency sponsored by Hamas, particularly active in cities such as Jenin and Nablus. These circumstances have resulted in multiple Israeli army incursions into these cities.
The reality is that without cooperation with Israel, Hamas would likely have inflicted even greater damage to the PNA’s position in the West Bank. Furthermore, the PNA heavily relies on foreign aid, with the European Union and the United States serving as its main donors. This dependency leaves little room for adopting a more confrontational stance against Israel, as it could lead to a complete financial collapse. Considering these factors, Fatah may find itself in a difficult position, navigating the delicate balance between preserving public support and the need for cooperation with Israel to maintain stability and financial viability.
The conflict has the potential to regionalize
Despite the challenges and disincentives for Hezbollah to engage in a full-scale attack on Israel, recent events have seen Hezbollah launching rockets and missiles at northern Israel from Lebanon, as well as attacking Israeli army posts along the border. These actions have prompted Israeli artillery shelling in response, creating a volatile situation where tensions and miscalculations lay the foundation for potential further escalation. Furthermore, there is a possibility that Iran may seek to escalate the conflict, even if it means putting its proxy, Hezbollah, in a precarious position with potential consequences for Lebanon and Hezbollah itself -even though Iran’s intentions regarding full escalation are far from clear. The risk of provoking intervention from the United States adds another layer of complexity, as the U.S. has deployed Marine rapid response forces in the Eastern Mediterranean to deter direct involvement by Hezbollah and Iran in the ongoing conflict.
Additionally, Iran can rely on its various proxies operating in countries where Iranian influence is strong, such as Iraq and Syria, to increase attacks from the Syrian border with Israel, while also relying on the Houthis in Yemen to disrupt maritime trade into Israel. This combination of factors increases the likelihood of continued escalation and underscores the potential for the conflict to spiral into a larger-scale confrontation involving multiple actors beyond Hamas and Israel. In any case, it is far from evident whether Iran plans to escalate the conflict into an all-out regional war.
It is unclear to what extent the normalization process between Saudi Arabia will be irreversibly severed
It is essential to consider that the Saudi government’s motivation for seeking to normalize relations with Israel extends beyond expected benefits in terms of security cooperation and economic and trade projects. Alongside these reasons, Saudi Arabia also sought to establish a defense pact with the United States, viewing it as a crucial element to ensure its security in the face of the Iranian threat. Despite the recent resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, facilitated by China, Saudi Arabia still perceives Iran as a continuing security concern. Additionally, while China played a role in brokering the agreement, it is unlikely that China can provide the same level of security cooperation to Saudi Arabia as the United States can offer in the Middle East. Therefore, it remains possible for Saudi Arabia to proceed with the normalization process even after the conflict ends.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the aftermath of the Gaza invasion and its devastating consequences have the potential to complicate the Saudi government’s push for normalization. Public opinion and its perception of the government’s stance on the Gaza ground invasion can heavily influence the overall feasibility and acceptance of the normalization process within Saudi Arabia and other Arab States that have already normalized their relations with Israel, since this issue is highly emotive for the vast majority of the population and even autocratic regimes struggle to ignore public opinions when it comes to very sensitive issues.
Turkey has geopolitical interests in maintaining its restored diplomatic relations with Israel, although it is uncertain whether internal considerations and the neo-ottoman vector of its foreign policy will take preference
Despite the long diplomatic spat between Turkey and Israel due to their differing views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Gaza flotilla incident, it is possible that the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries will not be greatly affected. While Turkey will undoubtedly continue to advocate for Palestinian interests and fiercely criticize Israel in the diplomatic arena, geopolitical considerations can entail the preservation of the restored diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Firstly, Turkey is currently experiencing economic difficulties and is in need of economic cooperation. In this regard, the energy sector provides Turkey with great opportunities if it cooperates with Israel. This is because the most economically viable way for Israeli gas to reach Europe is through Turkey. By establishing formal diplomatic ties with Israel, Ankara stands to benefit economically and potentially make significant gains from this collaboration. Furthermore, maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel could enhance Turkey’s diplomatic standing, particularly in its relationship with the United States. Turkey is currently seeking authorization from the US Senate for the export of F-16 fighters, as well as to reinforce its security and defense relations with Washington. Keeping diplomatic relations with Israel may strengthen Turkey’s position in negotiating these arrangements with the United States.
However, Erdogan’s electoral base is deeply influenced by the Palestinian issue and draws strong support from the Islamist rhetoric. Additionally, one of Erdogan’s key foreign policy objectives is to maintain a significant influence in the Middle East, reclaiming the historical perspective of the Ottoman Empire, and establishing Turkey as a leading player within the Sunni bloc in the region. This vision prioritizes Turkey’s regional presence and leadership. As tensions rise and Israeli actions in Gaza escalate, Turkey may be more inclined to adopt a confrontational approach, given that failing to do so could undermine its credibility as a regional leader. Consequently, depending on the evolving circumstances, the Turkish government might demonstrate a much harsher stance towards Israel, potentially resulting in strain or even the jeopardizing of diplomatic relations between both nations.
The growing alignment between Iran and Russia may force Israel to recalibrate its policy towards Russia
The Syrian Civil War prompted Hezbollah to intervene in support of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, as they share a close alliance with Iran. Since then, Hezbollah has operated in Syrian territory and has launched hostile actions against Israel from there. Consequently, Israel has dedicated significant resources to combating the threat posed by Hezbollah in Syria. While these operations have not been publicly acknowledged, their aim is to prevent Hezbollah and Iran, its main ally, from taking actions that endanger Israel’s security. However, due to Russia’s significant influence in Syria, where it is also a major ally of Al-Assad, Israel considers Moscow’s acquiescence crucial for conducting operations against Hezbollah in Syria and obtaining intelligence on both Hezbollah and Iran. Consequently, Israel has taken a discreet stance regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has formally condemned the invasion at the UN and provided humanitarian aid but has refrained from supplying lethal military aid to Ukraine or imposing sanctions on Russia, thereby diverging from Western policy towards Russia.
Nonetheless, Russia has increasingly been expanding its defense cooperation with Iran in response to the challenges it faces in Ukraine. This includes the acquisition of advanced Iranian drones, which raises doubts about the alignment between Russia and Iran. It remains uncertain whether Russia has provided intelligence on the 7th October attacks on Israel, which could indicate closer Russian alignment with Iran and the unreliability of cooperating with Russia. Regardless of what happened, it is clear to Israel that the beginning of this war suits the interests of Russia, as it forces diversion of part of Western resources and attention from Ukraine to the Middle East. If Israel concludes that security cooperation with Russia is no longer reliable and does not yield critical benefits, it may lead to a realignment of Israeli policy towards Russia and its stance on the Ukraine conflict.
The EU at a crossroad: the risks of losing the global south
The EU member states have divided into three major groups in addressing the war that started with the Hamas attack on October 7th. The first group, consisting of Eastern European countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, has shown unconditional support for Israel. The second group, including countries like Germany and France, provides clear support to Israel but conditions it on respect for International Humanitarian Law in conducting hostilities and maintaining a two-state solution to the conflict. The third group, with members like Spain and Ireland, recognizes Israel’s right to defend itself but demands an immediate ceasefire, without mentioning the possibility of overthrowing Hamas and focusing on the humanitarian crisis generated by Israel’s intervention in Gaza. Although the European Council managed to approve a common stance in its conclusions on October 26th, which aligns more closely with the position expressed by the second group, each member state continues to maintain its own approach, as shown by the Czech Republic’s defense minister proposing to withdraw from the UN in response to the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on October 26th, calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire.
In any case, and in general terms, the European position is perceived in the Middle East and other regions of the Global South as too aligned with the United States government, which has provided almost unconditional support for Israel’s military actions in Gaza and the large number of civilian casualties they have caused. Many actors in the Global South interpret this as evidence of double moral standards on the part of the EU, especially when compared to its position regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war crimes committed by the Russian army in that country. This perception is reinforced by the declarations and actions of the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, who received criticism for acting unilaterally and without coordination with the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell. All of this poses risks for the EU in terms of its ability to project geopolitical influence at a time of intense competition with China and Russia in certain areas of the Global South.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
