The Energy Crisis and the Renewables Vanity
By Oriol Parera
18/01/2022
It is too early to say whether the emerging energy crisis will be similar in magnitude to the 1973 oil crisis, or whether it will lead to changes in global energy strategies. That crisis highlighted the problems affecting many states in terms of energy dependence and drove radical changes in energy supply and production. If almost 50 years ago the shortage of oil began a gradual abandonment of oil as a fuel for electricity production (reserved mainly for transportation), today we may find ourselves facing a shortage or increase in gas prices that requires us to look for alternatives.
The recent annual international conference on climate change (COP26 in Glasgow) discussed for the umpteenth time the best global strategy to tackle decarbonisation. This conference is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, born in 1992, and like its predecessors, it continues to be seen as a platform for agreements on minimum standards, promises, and delays in commitments to prevent climate change. The Paris Agreements adopted in 2015, which replaced the well-known Kyoto Protocol, set the global goals to be achieved but without specifying the roadmap to reach them. Defining this roadmap falls on the will of each member state. These treaties (promoted by the United Nations) lack any binding effect as there are no mechanisms to enforce them and they only establish mechanisms to help states that wish to accede to them. The fight against climate change repeatedly clashes with the national and economic interests of states, which is why not all the mechanisms available to reduce global warming are being implemented. The fight against climate change will become a reality when it is really considered a first-rate national interest or is not opposed to short-term economic and social development. The example of the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer demonstrates that a challenge can be positively addressed if measures to combat it do not conflict with national interests or if their costs are affordable.
The consensus on the need to decarbonise society is overall irrefutable. And that is why we need the intervention of all the elements that are free of CO2, mainly –but not only – renewable energies. Renewables vanity is based on the belief that in the current state of technological development, renewable energies can fully meet the energy needs of the planet without any other support. A reality that may be plausible locally for some states or small communities, but far from it globally speaking.
In any energy debate, the definitions of green, renewable, CO2-free energy are used as if they were synonymous or represented by the same actor. Green energy always ends up being a controversial concept subject to interpretations and manipulations depending on the threshold in the environmental impact to be considered. For this reason, it is more consistent and rational to talk about renewable energy and CO2-free energy sources, as these terms are often used falsely to exclude nuclear energy from the decarbonization equation, despite being the only non-renewable CO2-free source that has no limitations on short and medium-term expansion.
Lobbies and needs
Lobbies are pressure groups that exist to represent economic interests, to have an impact on the public opinion, and achieve political influence. They are a fully-fledged and regulated tool in democratic societies that generally have a proportional weight to the size of the market or interest they represent. And the energy sector is no exception. Within the energy sector there are several pressure groups to represent the different energy sources and in Europe, the gas lobby has been well accepted in recent decades, especially in favor of its belligerent position towards nuclear energy (a direct rival). The absence of the nuclear option in the hydrogen roadmap of the European Commission is noteworthy, especially when compared to similar roadmaps of other states in which nuclear power plays a relevant role in the decarbonization goals. The European anti-nuclear position has been largely led and monopolized by Germany against the French position, and has recently been strengthened by the loss of its British counterweight. However, in the current energy context, a significant change is expected during this year, when the presidency of the Council of the European Union by France in the first half of 2022 could mean a change in trend.
Although the European Union is one of the most belligerent international organizations against nuclear energy, the urgent climate needs and the current energy crisis are increasingly leading to the recognition of nuclear energy as an essential source to achieve emission neutrality by 2050. We are on the verge of finally approving the revision of the taxonomic report presented by the European Commission (EC), which includes and classifies nuclear energy as green energy. The EC has no doubts about the need for nuclear energy as a stable and necessary source, especially after the recent statements by President Von der Leyen. The final approval would be a very important development in Europe, as it would open the door for the nuclear industry to receive the EC’s aid mechanisms for the development of a greenhouse gas-neutral industry. However, in order to facilitate its approval by the most belligerent states, gas has also been included as a necessary energy for the ecological transition, as long as it complies with the fixed limitations of CO2 emissions.
Renewable deployment currently has major technical limitations regardless of the amount of effort and money put into it, and the German case is an example. A decade of titanic economic efforts to decarbonize the production of electricity has not represented a major change in its CO2 emissions. It has not been able to eradicate the use of coal, much less gas, and continues to rely on it for its electricity mix. Due to the ecological assumptions established by German politics and public opinion focused primarily on the closure of its nuclear fleet (CO2 free) in a first phase, they have not been translated into any substantial improvement after 10 years of Energiewende.
The idea that nuclear energy is considered as a transition source (a role attributed to natural gas) is beginning to crumble, and it is starting to be seen as a stable source in the system that acts as a counterweight to the intermittency of renewable energies. However, the interests of the gas industry will continue to be present. In this regard, it remains to be seen whether the EC’s taxonomy report will also include the introduction of gas along with nuclear as the energy needed to combat climate change. For this reason, an extensive educational and communicative effort is needed to explain that both renewable and nuclear energy are urgently needed to combat the climate challenge and the only ones free of greenhouse gases to build a decarbonised society in the medium term.
Nevertheless, there are fewer and fewer energy-dependent states renouncing the nuclear option, mainly concentrated in Western Europe. Furthermore, in these states public opinion is not clearly facing up to the challenge and all demands, faults and frustrations are relegated to the administration. Anti-nuclear arguments are slowly fading and statements such as those of President Macron announcing a relaunch of nuclear power in France to ensure energy independence and to achieve the decarbonisation targets show that options are limited and that arithmetic does not deceive.
Another factor that consolidates nuclear energy as a necessary response to the challenge of growth and competitiveness. The nuclear sector currently supports more than one million jobs in Europe, and over half a million of those are classed as highly-skilled. This implies a huge economic impact, especially considering that it involves technology segments with strong export capacity.
However, waste is indeed the big Achilles heel of nuclear power due to the long time it takes to reduce its radiation levels. Currently, waste management strategies do not include complete recycling and are generally based on long-term storage in temporary or deep geological repositories. Nonetheless, due to the high energy density of nuclear energy, the volume of its waste is proportionally small and easily manageable compared to the large amounts of waste produced and released by other industries. This allows the costs associated with the storage and management of the waste to be assumed by the nuclear industry itself and fully regulated by the administration, which according to internationally agreed management methods do not cause any harmful effects on the environment, contrary to the emissions of fossil fuels that constantly pollute and modify the climate. In any case, there is still a perception of excessive risk on nuclear waste influenced mainly by old bad practices (already eradicated) and by the media, without assessing the zero environmental impact they cause under proper management. However, it should also be considered that new generations of reactors and recycling technologies will be able to take advantage of fuel and use waste to substantially reduce the long periods currently needed to reduce the radiation levels.
The Iberian Peninsula and the Iberian Island
The possibility of a power blackout or loss of electricity supply has recently been debated in Europe because of the German and Austrian governments’ announcements. The European electricity grid is well interconnected between the different states, which helps a more efficient distribution of the electricity supply, facilitates exchange, and makes it more resilient. However, despite being stronger overall, a partial collapse of one state grid can harm the overall group in a chain reaction affecting other dependent states. Extensive implementation of renewable energy causes severe instabilities in the electricity grid as their production cannot be regulated, making it difficult to adapt to demand. Replacing baseload energy sources requires a counterbalance to renewable instability (when there is no wind or sun) and that is mainly covered by gas. This requires a steady supply of gas that is not currently reliable if it comes mostly from Russia.
Germany’s renewable strategy is to be dependent on Russian gas and to minimize the damage it must strive to have a constant supply at the best possible price. For this reason, it has a determined interest in the Nord Stream gas pipeline, as it connects them directly to Russia and avoids the Yamal gas pipeline and its inconvenient intermediaries such as Belarus, which can lead to supply interruptions.
The Iberian Peninsula is not expected to be hit by instabilities from the European electrical grid, as its interconnections with France are scarce and easily compensated by domestic resources. In this sense, the minimal international electricity interconnection can benefit the whole peninsula in slowing down and blocking possible blackouts and supply losses occurring in the heart of Europe.
The Spanish state is one of the few that does not consider or want to consider nuclear energy as an option for the future. The PNIEC (National Integrated Energy and Climate Plan) has a similar approach to the German strategy and nuclear shutdown is expected to begin in 6 years. Obviously, the proposed “green transition” is heavily based on gas, a source of energy that needs to be imported, and it does so mainly by gas carriers, especially after the closure of the Maghreb gas pipeline through Morocco this November. Although the supply is guaranteed via the Medgaz pipeline and by gas carriers from Algeria, what is not clear is at what price. Gas costs are likely to rise as the transport of liquefied gas by gas tankers is more complex than through a pipeline and is subject to the growing demand for this fuel and the ships that carry it. This leaves Spain even more dependent on natural gas coming from an unstable region and on a liquefied gas that is beginning to be coveted more and more by Asian countries.
Spain is following in the footsteps of Germany with a lag of 10-20 years, enough time to analyze the results of the German strategy and consider a rethink if necessary. Both states have big gas-based economic interests, which is why their lobbies are strong and public opinion is responding accordingly.
Catalan reality
In Catalonia, however, future prospects are more discouraging. Not having direct responsibility in the national energy strategy should allow it to have more critical thinking adapted to the current reality and needs. But that is not the case, and political and popular opinion remains conservative and in line with the interests of the Spanish state.
On the one hand, we have the administration through the ICAEN (Catalan Energy Institute) with its PROENCAT 2050 which has made a study of energy prospects for 2050 deliberately ignoring the nuclear option as a decarbonizing alternative. The study is limited since it proposes to meet the demand projections only with renewable sources, ignoring their intermittency and low load factor. It also does not offer realistic solutions for the implementation and storage of surplus, which leaves the study faulty in objectivity.
On the other hand, we have a NIMBY society (Not In My Back Yard) that systematically opposes the implementation of new wind and solar farms unless they are built far from their homes. This has led, for example, Andreu Mas-Colell proposing that the only alternative is for Catalonia to become an importer of renewable energy from the Aragon region. This proposal, which should be considered as a provocative exercise to raise awareness, is unfortunately well received and debated in the context of conferences organized by certain public sectors and professional associations. It is more than obvious the great disadvantages that this would mean strictly in the territorial scope of Catalonia; dependency, loss of control, loss of jobs, outsourcing, larger grid… And all because it does not want to face the scars on the land, the big problem, the great vanity. To keep with this, one would have to advocate decommissioning the hydropower plants and dams in order to restore the natural course of the rivers, but it is quite clear why this will not happen. Today it would be unthinkable to build the big dams on the Pyrenees or the ones on the great rivers from which we gladly and uncritically accept electricity production.
However, many supporters of renewable energy as the only option to consider justify their position by saying that energy consumption must be substantially reduced and that the world cannot afford current energy consumption. Certainly, the planet cannot afford the current level of emissions, but of course, it can support current energy consumption. A reduction in global energy consumption is neither expected nor feasible if all the developing countries are to meet the standards of developed countries, nor is it expected that the more developed societies will want to give up the level of prosperity they have achieved.
In Catalonia, energy is usually explained as a dichotomy, good and bad, putting nuclear in the package of polluting energy sources that cannot help mitigate climate change and moving it out of the equation without even debating it. Not only is there no attempt at positioning Catalonia at the avant-garde of the new generation nuclear reactors (like the SMR), but instead there is a debate on the number of windmills that should be installed in the Aragon region. It would be necessary, therefore, that the new ecological tendencies begin to coalesce in the collective mind, and thus modernize the obsolete environmental doctrines of the twentieth century. Gone are the days when pioneering energy companies were created in Catalonia to adopt the new technological advances in electricity generation of each era, such as FECSA, ENHER, HECSA, and HIFRENSA (responsible for the first nuclear power plant in Catalonia).
Oriol Parera is an engineer and researcher in nuclear safety at the European Commission. He holds a master’s degree in Nuclear Engineering from the Polytechnic University of Catalonia and the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
