The 23rd Province: Taiwan Seen From the Mainland

By Rita Giménez

In April, when we saw high-level European representatives visiting China, and the media centered on the Chinese military actions near the region, it was a good moment to ask ourselves a rather complex question: “will Taiwan become the 23rd Chinese province, or will it remain a de facto sovereign state?” The diverging answers to this query can be said to underline the island’s key role in the tensions between the US and China, and to be at the core of debates and newspaper articles across the globe.

However, from the point of view of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the answer is very clear. Along the usual official line, the latest statement within the work report[1] submitted by the Chinese government to the national legislature, leaves no room for misunderstandings: “China will take resolute steps to oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ and advance the process of the country’s peaceful reunification.”[2] Reunification is therefore a just cause for the Chinese government; a step further towards the restoration of the PRC’s past losses to foreign invaders and colonialists.

This point of view is often misunderstood and undermentioned, thus most of the accessible or mainstream analyses of the Taiwan issue tend to contain certain biases. Given the significant role that the Taiwan question plays in current geopolitical tensions and the potential far-reaching consequences of an escalation in the Strait, it is imperative to comprehend the perspectives of all parties involved.

It is the goal of this analysis to give the readers basic elements to get the whole picture of the conflict , explaining what guides the mainland’s[3] stance towards Taiwan through the analysis of documents issued by the Chinese administration, articles from Chinese national media outlets and statements made by official leaders.

The importance of (historical) narrative

The centrality that the rising tensions between the US and China take in analyzing the Taiwan question usually obscures the interests and historical narratives of the actors directly involved. From a Western perspective, the narrative around the Taiwan issue is generally portrayed using a one-way narrative[4], aimed at diminishing the image of China as a potential global leader. That reaches a point where, recently, there has been a growing popularity in the argument that China’s interest in Taiwan is primarily driven by its semiconductor industry. This argument clearly fails to acknowledge the historical reality surrounding Taiwan that predates the time when such technology became a central aspect of the global economy.

For instance, looking back to 2022, there is an event that turned global attention toward China and Taiwan relations. The visit to the island of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, was widely covered. As the Chinese administration responded to what they felt was a “provocation”, the headlines of the West pointed to a possible escalation of the conflict and were quick in making analogies with the Russia-Ukraine war.

During a period in which China, as a global crescent leader, was attempting to become a mediator for such a relevant conflict, it needed to counter the international headlines, so, in the wake of Pelosi’s trip, the Mission of the PRC to the European Union (EU) started to publish periodically a series of “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question”[5] on its website. Below are the topics covered:

  • What’s the origin of the Taiwan question? (published on August 12th)
  • What is the one-China principle? What is the basis of the one-China principle? (published on August 15th)
  • What are the basic principles of the Chinese government for resolving the Taiwan question? (published on August 16th)
  • What political commitments have the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) made on the Taiwan question? (published on August 19th)
  • Why are the Taiwan question and the Ukraine issue incomparable at all? (published on August 26th)
  • How to view Nancy Pelosi’s visit? (published on September 6th)
  • Who is changing the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, and who should be responsible for the current escalation of the situation in the Taiwan Strait? (published on September 13th)

The selection can be related to the publication, only a few days earlier (on August 10th), of the White Paper “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era”[6] by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the State Council Information Office of the PRC. The third official white paper on the issue[7].

This type of publication, all available in English, are key to grasp the view of Taiwan from the Chinese administration’s perspective. Mainly because one can identify several factors which characterize the Chinese official narrative. Due to the limited scope of this article, we will highlight the importance of historical ties and amendments, and its link with national reunification and rejuvenation. The article will also explore the guiding principles and their role in the search for international legitimacy by the Chinese leadership.

Foremost, the opening sentence of the first section of the white paper sets the tone for the centrality of the historical narrative and the importance of common roots: “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times”. Later, the text specifies, “[t]he earliest references to this effect are to be found, among others, in [the] Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer compiled in the year 230 by Shen Ying of the State of Wu during the Three Kingdoms Period.” And, perhaps most importantly, “in 1885, Taiwan’s status was upgraded, and it became the 20th province of China.” This point is essential because 10 years after that, in 1895, during the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory, the Qing government will cede Taiwan, marking the official separation of the “Chinese people”.

The role of foreign countries, not only Japan, in the breakup of the territory and the “humiliation” period of Chinese history is another element to take into consideration within the mainland’s narrative. This is well portrayed throughout the white paper as well, for instance, when it mentions: “In the modern era from the mid-19th century, due to the aggression of Western powers and the decadence of feudal rule, China was gradually reduced to a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, and went through a period of suffering worse than anything it had previously known.”

The Chinese leadership is aware that, although the amendments need to be requested to heal past wounds, most foreign countries involved in the historical developments at that time are important players in the current international power system. So, it seeks their acknowledgment through legitimized supranational organisms, such as the United Nations. One can argue this is why the second sentence of the initial section of the white paper mentions the legal aspect of the Taiwan issue, as a form to address these countries: “This statement, [Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times], has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence.” Later in the text, one can find the reference to the United Nation’s Resolution 2758, described as “a political document encapsulating the one-China principle whose legal authority leaves no room for doubt and has been acknowledged worldwide.

The principles: peaceful reunification, one-China policy, and the 1992 Consensus

From the mainland’s perspective, “the one-China principle[8] represents the universal consensus of the international community” and, in order to establish and sustain diplomatic relations with the PRC, any given country has to respect it. On the other hand, the 1992 Consensus refers to the development and maintenance of orderly relations between Taiwan and mainland China. However, some analysts indicate that the Consensus is too ambiguous[9] and focused on the relations between the CPC and the Kuo Ming Tang (KMT), and might not have considered the change in the island’s leadership.

Now, the PRC argues that the current Taiwanese government is not abiding by the Consensus and, as a consequence, is encouraging the foreign interference in a domestic issue: “in recent years, the Taiwan authorities, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have redoubled their efforts to divide the country, and some external forces have tried to exploit Taiwan to contain China, prevent the Chinese nation from achieving complete reunification, and halt the process of national rejuvenation.”

The goal of national rejuvenation, a core concept of Xi Jinping’s leadership and of the “China Dream”[10], will only be achieved with reunification. As mentioned at the start of the article, reunification is therefore a cause for the Chinese government; a step further towards the restoration of the PRC’s past losses to foreign invaders and colonialists and, as the white paper captures: “[a]ttempts to reject reunification and split the country are doomed because they will founder against the history and culture of the Chinese nation, as well as the resolve and commitment of more than 1.4 billion Chinese people.” 

What can we expect

On the international front, it is expected that the CCP will keep its assertiveness as to maintain and reinforce China’s position as a valid leader. Especially looking towards the US, the PRC will continue upholding the non-interference principle and categorizing any US or other foreign countries’ actions in the area as a provocation[11]. We can also expect to see news that reinforce the mainland’s stance towards groups that aim at promoting the independence of Taiwan, such as the recent ban announced for both Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats[12].

Moreover, it is likely that we will see crescent Chinese national media references to common roots and similar traditions. An example being the visit to the mainland by Ma Ying-Jeou, a former KMT chairman[13] who had a key role in the development of Taipei-Beijing relations. The trip’s context is noteworthy, as it was to celebrate the Tomb Sweeping Festival (Qingming Jie), a Chinese holiday in which families honor their ancestors. During his visit, Mr. Ma referred to another one of the actions that the Chinese government will likely put their efforts into: “[r]esuming exchanges and dialogue as soon as possible benefits the interests of the Taiwan people the most.”

How was this trip perceived by the Taiwanese population? According to a poll by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), the visit was quite polarizing, with 39.2% approval vs. 43.7% disagreement[14]. Taking a closer look into the former, people aged 45 to 54 had a majority approving of Ma’s trip, and more than 40% of the youngest group (ages 20 to 34) were also in favor. People with a higher educational background also tended to support the former president’s journey more. If actions like this will serve the KMT towards a win in the Presidential elections of 2024 remain to be seen and analyzed in the upcoming months.

Partially in order to maintain or increase the approval rate amongst the Taiwanese youth, we can also expect the exchanges Ma mentioned to be concentrated on this population group, as part of the future of the common nation. At a press conference in mid-April this year, Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, said that furthering exchanges between the young people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait “can instill vitality and vigor into the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations”[15]. Media campaigns can also serve as an example of how the PRC aims to capture their attention[16]. Additionally, it is likely that we will see an increase in youth exchange programs and Summits[17], with messages like a recent one made by the China Youth Development Union in Taiwan[18]: “Young people from Taiwan who seek development on the Chinese mainland should act as a bridge for cross-Straits exchanges and promote peaceful reunification of the two sides across the Taiwan Straits.”

Currently, there is no available data to compare youth migration flows from Taiwan to the mainland, and the few examples of analysis which tackle the viewpoint of this particular population group on China focus on their difficulties in adapting to life in the PRC[19]. Nevertheless, the Chinese government remains confident that the constant growth of its country’s economy, as well as the plans in place, will be appealing to Taiwanese young people. “Grounding its effort in the new development stage, the mainland is committed to applying the new development philosophy, creating a new development dynamic, and promoting high-quality development.

Concluding remarks

All in all, while the status of Taiwan is a habitual topic in international relations debates, and is increasingly portrayed in global media outlets, it is unusually analyzed by taking a closer look at official documents issued by the PRC.

In an attempt to provide an alternative perspective, this article has looked into the basic elements of the PRC’s narrative, principles and some of its government’s actions, which will hopefully serve the reader as a valuable tool for a more in-depth research into Chinese policy and thought.

Rita Giménez is currently a policy consultant at 19N Strategies and a China analyst. She is a Political Scientist Autonomous University of Barcelona and master’s in Chinese Politics and Diplomacy from Fudan University.

NOTES

[1] Li Kechiang, “Report on the work of the government – Delivered at the First Session of the 14th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 5, 2023”. Mar. 5, 2023. Accessible through: https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/2023-Government-Work-Report.pdf.

[2] “China to resolutely oppose ‘Taiwan independence,’ advance peaceful reunification”. Xinhua News. Mar. 5, 2023. Accessible through: http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/202303/05/content_WS6403f935c6d0a757729e7ad5.html

[3] In this article, the concept of “mainland” is portrayed as equal to “Chinese administration” or “government”.

[4] Since the scope of this article is focused on the perspective of mainland China, it is my hope that citing here a recent article written by a fellow IR analyst, Miquel Haro, will bring more clarity to the reader. Available through: https://loopmedia.app/Ak3l4rr3/%C2%BFpor-que-taiwan-es-tan-importante

[5] Mission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the European Union (EU) – “Questions and Answers Concerning the Taiwan Question”.  Aug. 12, 2022. Accessible through: http://eu.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/more/20220812Taiwan/

[6] “China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era”. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Aug. 10, 2022. Accessible through: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html#:~:text=The%20white%20paper%20was%20released,government%20in%20the%20new%20era

[7] The other two are “Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” (August 1993), and “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (February 2000).

[8] Also referred to as “One Country, Two Systems”.

[9] Drun, Jessica. “The KMT Continues to Grapple with its ‘1992 Consensus’”.  Global Taiwan Institute. Sep. 21, 2022. Accessible through:   https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/09/the-kmt-continues-to-grapple-with-its-1992-consensus/

[10] “What does the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation mean for China?” CGTN. ​​Nov. 26, 2022. Accessible through: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-11-26/What-does-the-Chinese-Dream-of-national-rejuvenation-mean-for-China–1fh97eRy1tS/index.html

[11] “China’s top legislature issues statement on meeting between US House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, Tsai Ing-wen”. Xinhua News. Apr. 6, 2023. Accessible through:  https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/06/WS642dff5da31057c47ebb8798.html

[12] “Mainland bans heads of two Taiwan organizations”. Xinhua News. Apr. 7, 2023. Accessible through: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/07/WS642f7cdba31057c47ebb8d6d.html

[13] Zhang Yi. “Ma Ying-jeou calls for adhering to 1992 Consensus”. Apr. 7, 2023. Accessible through:  https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/07/WS642ffe41a31057c47ebb8f3d.html

[14] “Chinese People’s Feelings about Ma Ying-Jeou’s Ancestral Worship in Mainland China”. TPOF. Apr. 13, 2023. Accessible through:

https://www.tpof.org/%e7%b2%be%e9%81%b8%e6%96%87%e7%ab%a0/2023%e5%b9%b44%e6%9c%8813%e6%97%a5%e3%80%8c%e5%9c%8b%e4%ba%ba%e5%b0%8d%e9%a6%ac%e8%8b%b1%e4%b9%9d%e5%a4%a7%e9%99%b8%e7%a5%ad%e7%a5%96%e8%a1%a8%e7%8f%be%e7%9a%84%e6%84%9f%e8%a6%ba%e3%80%8d/

[15] “Mainland willing to create all conditions to support cross-Strait youth exchanges: spokesperson”. Xinhua. Apr. 13, 2023. Accessible through: http://eng.taiwan.cn/Press_conference/202304/t20230414_12526933.htm

[16] “Taiwan youths find root in mainland”. China Daily. Apr. 3, 2023. Accessible through: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202304/03/WS642a07baa31057c47ebb7ebe.html

[17] Cao Bing. “2022 Cross-Strait Youth Summit: Young people from Chinese mainland, Taiwan gather in Beijing to promote exchanges”. CGTN. Jul. 22, 2022. Accessible through:  https://news.cgtn.com/news/2022-07-21/VHJhbnNjcmlwdDY3MjU1/index.html

[18] Zhang Yi. “Young people should act as a bridge for Taiwan and mainland”. Mar. 10, 2023. Accessible through: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202303/10/WS640b41f4a31057c47ebb3b06.html

[19] Chen Chao. “Why Young People From Taiwan Struggle to Adjust to Mainland Life”. Sixth Tone. Jan. 25, 2019. Accessible through: https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1003494

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.


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