Joe Biden’s presidency and the possible geopolitical shifts in the Middle East
29/01/2021
President Joe Biden has inherited a state of disorder in the Middle East from Donald Trump. Powers such as Russia and Turkey have filled the vacuum as the US has, to a certain degree, isolated itself from regional issues. Biden is expected to make a comeback to the region that, to some extent, goes through the gateways of Damascus and Tehran, precisely where Trump’s administration has applied the highest degree of either disengagement or confrontation. This will be a challenging scenario, as in doing so, he will clash with his allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
Joe Biden has made it clear that among his first foreign policy priorities will be to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) signed in 2015 by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, and bring a permanent solution to the Syrian crisis. President Biden has a good knowledge of both issues as he had an active role in diplomacy and negotiations in the Obama administration. However, Trump’s administration has brought radical changes to the Middle East. Today, the US has to win back its partners’ trust and cooperate with its rivals to bring stability to the region.
An agreement with Iran and Reconciliation in the Gulf?
Biden’s policy towards the Iranian nuclear program will not be so easy, as Israel is trying to reach out to partners in the Gulf to contain Iran’s aspirations in the region. With Biden as his vice president, former US President Barack Obama signed the Iranian nuclear deal with other great powers in 2015. This was one of the successful diplomatic achievements of the Obama administration. However, Trump withdrew from the accord in 2018 and imposed “maximum pressure” on Iran by imposing sanctions and assassinating key Iranian figures.
Israeli “Channel 12” TV recently stated that officials from the Biden administration have already begun holding secret talks with Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear deal that was signed in 2015. Israel’s PM Benjamin Netanyahu warned against the US rejoining the nuclear agreement and started pushing Biden to amend the deal and include limitations on Iran’s ballistic missile program, as well as halting its support for armed groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas in the region.
Tehran is cautious about how to react to Biden’s new administration. Iranian officials have said that they welcome the Americans’ return to the agreement, but only after they lift sanctions. Meanwhile, Tehran made it clear that they reject any amendment to the 2015 deal. In mid-December, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Tehran was not particularly “excited” about Biden taking office, but they were “very happy” to see Trump go. This is yet another indication of how Trump’s sanctions have caused serious damage to Iran’s economy. According to figures made public by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran’s GDP started contracting as the Trump administration started imposing sanctions.
Economic difficulties are precisely the reason behind the 2019 series of episodes of nationwide civil unrest in Iran, where protesters called for the government’s resignation and some even for a change of regime. Tehran’s ruling elite is aware that they cannot postpone negotiations any further, and their economy needs oxygen. However, hardliners are pushing for more confrontation with the US in the region. So what can be done?
US President Joe Biden has nominated a key negotiator in the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, Wendy Sherman, to be the next US Deputy Secretary of State, the second-highest-ranking position at the State Department. This is a clear signal that Biden is paving the road for negotiations. In contrast to Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” towards Tehran, Biden and his advisers have already promised a more conciliatory approach centered around a similar accord to the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Already, Germany, France, and the UK have signaled support for a new deal. In a statement released in early December, the three European countries welcomed “a diplomatic path to address wider concerns with Iran.” Amid global support for negotiations, Iran cannot reject these calls and has to accept a new deal, which will be a compromise between the West’s and its own interests. Furthermore, Iran’s main partners, China and Russia, who were influential in the 2015 deal, are also pushing for a deal as they have an economic interest in bringing stability to the Middle East.
To create a positive environment, Tehran has come up with a regional proposal, the “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” or HOPE. The initiative invites Iran’s neighbors to discuss their regional security concerns. Tehran knows that to secure a deal, it needs the Gulf states’ support and is well aware that Israel is trying to isolate its position in the Gulf and approach its regional rivals such as the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. As Bahrain and the UAE have already normalized their relations with Israel, the next on the list would be the Saudi kingdom. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the new year, Qatar and Saudi Arabia agreed to reopen their embassies and their borders, with the blessing of Iran and Turkey. This was a significant diplomatic victory for Qatar and provided Iran’s additional hope for reconciliation in the Gulf. This normalization would pave the way for peace deals or breakthroughs in troubled countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.
Coming terms with Russia in Syria
Years of neglect have left the US with very limited influence in Syria. Nevertheless, Syria remains central due to three factors: combating the destabilization of the Middle East, containing Iranian hegemony, and fighting radical Islamist movements such as ISIS or al Qaida. Joe Biden will inherit a considerable mess in this scenario, and he will be responsible for extinguishing the fire.
Syria is, therefore, another major challenge for Biden’s Middle East policy. Biden will have to engage in proactive diplomacy, reach out to allies or potential partners in Syria, and deal with Russia, Turkey, the Kurds, Iran, and the Syrian government. Given the balance of power on the ground, Biden’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin will be critical. In this sense, whether Biden will be able to reengage with the UN led political process and at the same time find common grounds for cooperation with Moscow will be one of the main challenges. But then there is Erdogan’s Turkey and its neo-Ottoman designs in Northern Syria. Will Biden be able to work with the Kurds, or will he abandon them to their fate, as Trump did? These are all major challenges that will entangle Biden’s policy towards Syria.
During a talk at Harvard’s Kennedy School in 2014, Biden told the audience of students: “Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria.” This statement created friction between him and the Turkish President. What is clear is that Biden will have to handle Erdogan delicately to resolve the crisis created by the S-400 missile system bought by Turkey from Russia. Biden also angers Erdogan because he insists that the US has to cooperate and arm the Kurdish units in Northern Syria who played a key role in defeating ISIS. Turkey may be forced to further cooperate with Russia to penetrate Northern Syria and clear certain strategic Kurdish villages. Moscow also mistrusts Erdogan’s expansionist intentions, so a possible deal with the Kurdish leaders to deploy Russian troops in key Kurdish cities and minimizing the American influence in northern Syria cannot be discarded. This is what actually happened recently in Ain Issa. As soon as Turkey pushed to take the city, Russia suggested the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) either vacate the city or transfer it to the control of the Syrian state. Yet, in the end, the two sides agreed that there would be a presence of Russian forces in those territories. This way of resolving the situation appears palatable to Ankara, as it gives it greater leverage in negotiations with Moscow, even though stationing Russian military elements in Ain Issa may create new contradictions between the two sides.
To conclude, the new US administration will most likely find itself in a position in which it has no alternative but to cooperate with at least one of the powers present in Northern Syria: Turkey or Russia. If Biden chooses to deal with Turkey, he will antagonize his main allies in the Syrian conflict: the Kurds. If he chooses to back Moscow, he may get a share in Syria and agree with Putin to sideline Iran, including giving the Israelis the green light to bomb Iranian military bases in Syria. Thus, it is quite likely that the US will not pull its forces out of Syria until it finds a solution for the Kurdish issue, and at the same time, contain Iran’s influence in the Levant. This may suit Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s interests in the long term. Whether he will prefer to be a Russian client rather than sink under Iranian influence and turn his already torn country into a battleground with Israel, it is to be seen.
A Future Assessment
Biden’s policy towards the region will most likely face many obstacles and challenges both from US allies and rivals. For this reason, the US must engage in pro-active diplomacy and provide certain guarantees to its Gulf allies and Israel while resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Whereas for Syria, the US will need to balance between Moscow and Ankara, and at the same time try to isolate Tehran based on Israeli demands. This means that, in the short term, Syria could turn into a proxy battleground between Israel and Iran until a deal has been reached on Iran’s nuclear program.
As said, a new deal will try to include Iran’s ballistic missile program and Tehran’s influence in the Levant. However, the Iranians are not yet ready for concessions. The Americans will need to reset the balance of power in the region and search for trustworthy partners. In the long run, this also means working with Moscow to bring stability to Syria and find a diplomatic solution for Iran’s nuclear problem.
Yeghia Tashjian is a regional analyst and researcher. He was a Research Assistant at the Armenian Diaspora Research Center at Haigazian University. He is currently the Regional Officer of Women in War, a gender-based think tank. He is a contributor to various local and regional newspapers and presenter of the “Turkey Today” program in Radio Voice of Van.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its members. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
