Climate Geopolitics, Human Rights, and the Whitewashing of Ethnic Cleansing: Azerbaijan and the COP29
09/11/2024
By Abel Riu and Mercè Amich
With COP29 set to begin in Baku on November 11, Azerbaijan will play a key role in the annual UN-organized climate change summit as the second member in the COP Presidency Trio. This “Troika,” established last year, coordinates the efforts of three successive presidencies -the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, and Brazil- until 2025.
COP28, held in Dubai at the end of 2023, set the political direction toward the goal of limiting global warming to a maximum of 1.5ºC. However, it failed to reach a consensus on a “phase-out” of fossil fuels, which was replaced with a more flexible term, “transition away.” This year, Azerbaijan has the duty to lead a COP focused on climate finance -that is, the economic commitments and funding needed for this transition (NQCGs), with special emphasis on low-income countries and communities most impacted by climate change.
Alongside the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contributions, the primary forum for the climate science community, the COPs serve as the United Nations’ main tool for negotiating international, multilateral commitments to combat climate change and develop adaptation mechanisms. Established in 1995, the significance of the COPs has grown steadily in line with the worsening biophysical conditions of the planet.
Since Azerbaijan was announced as the host for this year’s COP, numerous critical voices have emerged. These critiques stem both from Azerbaijan’s long history of human rights violations and from the fact that this is the third consecutive year the COP is hosted in a state where fossil fuels play a central role in the economy.
On November 8, the international human rights organization Global Witness announced an undercover investigation in which, posing as oil and gas investors, they received statements from Elnur Soltanov, Azerbaijan’s COP29 director. He reportedly offered “investment opportunities in fossil fuel exploitation” in the country, mentioning “numerous oil and gas wells ready for development.” This is not the first controversy involving COP participants and guests, especially in high-pollution industries: in 2022, for instance, COP27 hosted 636 lobbyists from the fossil fuel sector.
Climate change and decarbonization as mitigation strategies are no longer only environmental issues, if they ever were. They are central to understanding the emerging global order and interstate economic relationships, as well as countries’ long-term strategies to adapt to it. The incentives for “free-rider” positions are high, and the COP seeks to build diplomatic consensus for countries to develop their new national climate plans (Nationally Determined Contributions, or NDCs), due by 2025. While these NDCs are intended to implement the 2015 Paris Agreement, the IPCC itself has noted that their pace and scope remain “insufficient,” with multiple challenges in reaching and enacting consensus. For instance, at COP1 in 1995, OPEC members and partners (notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Iran) managed to secure a procedural rule requiring unanimous decision-making, a mechanism that over the years has prevented the establishment of a voting system when consensus is not reached.
The decarbonization of global economies is not just an energy shift; it redefines geopolitical dynamics and creates an arena where traditional power structures may be reconfigured. The conflicting interests between fossil fuel-dependent economies and the need to limit global warming to the 1.5ºC target are a primary obstacle to phasing out fossil fuels, though not the only one.
The race for technological innovation and control over production and trade cycles of greenhouse gas-reducing technologies offers a good example of this new scenario. In October, the European Union raised tariffs on Chinese-made plug-in electric vehicles to 43.5%, despite China’s prior threat to launch an anti-dumping investigation on European pork imports [1][2][3]. Still awaiting confirmation of the threat, it’s worth noting that despite a general decline in sales volume from 2020 to 2023, a significant portion of European pork exports to China come specifically from Catalonia. This stands as a good example of how the new context shapes risks that extend beyond purely climate-related issues, creating new realities that must also be taken into account.
Climate change itself also needs to be considered as a new destabilizing factor for economies that fail to adapt to the immediate climate realities of their surroundings, as is the case for the Mediterranean region. This region, where our country is located, is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of global warming, facing stronger and more prolonged heat waves, increased drought, and heightened flood risk. These issues, combined with growing climate uncertainty, pose a significant threat to sectors such as tourism to which the country’s economy is highly dependent on. Added to this is the impact that the current model has on various aspects like housing, the social use of the Catalan language, and overcrowding. Reducing economic dependence on this sector is therefore also an adaptation and risk-reduction policy.
Conversely, regional and international conflicts can destabilize the climate -an important factor in a time when these conflicts are multiplying across the globe. The interdependence of world economies is particularly evident in the transportation sector, one of the highest greenhouse gas emitters. For instance, recent attacks by Yemen’s Houthi forces on commercial ships passing through the Red Sea have forced a substantial portion of maritime traffic to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, significantly increasing global shipping emissions as a result.
At the same time, climate policy commitments are also tools of regional influence. The EU’s energy transition, established through the European Climate Law and the Fit for 55 initiative, outlines the REPowerEU plan to reduce the Union’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels. The political scope of this plan extends beyond purely climate goals, forming part of the EU’s sanctions against Russia in response to its military aggression in Ukraine.
Thus, climate issues and geopolitics intersect to serve the EU’s interests: advancing territorial decarbonization policies also serves as a tool to reduce this energy dependency, and therefore economic and political dependence, in relation to present-day threats in military and border terms. However, European decarbonization progress is not immediate. An example is the 2022 agreement between the European Union and Azerbaijan to increase gas supply to around 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually by 2027. The Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) project has been crucial for European energy diversification, positioning Azerbaijan as a key supplier to the Union and reinforcing Azerbaijan’s own reliance on fossil fuels as demand for gas grows. The apparent contradiction between Europe’s decarbonization aims and this reality, along with Azerbaijan’s leadership of COP29 as a fossil fuel-dependent nation, are two factors that warrant close scrutiny regarding the success of the upcoming negotiations and the role of COP itself as a forum for climate action.
The “Contract of the Century” and SOCAR’s role: oil and gas as the backbone of Azerbaijan’s economy and politics
Following the United Arab Emirates as host of the 2023 event, Azerbaijan will become the second consecutive “petrostate” to host a COP meeting. While Azerbaijan is not among the world’s top fossil fuel producers—currently accounting for less than 1% of global oil and gas production—its economy is one of the most dependent on hydrocarbon production and export worldwide. Fossil fuels represent more than 90% of the country’s exports and 64% of state revenue. The country’s energy mix is heavily fossil-fuel-based, with oil and natural gas accounting for over 98% of its total supply. Additionally, 90% of Azerbaijan’s electricity is generated from natural gas.
Azerbaijan’s relationship with hydrocarbons is longstanding. The first industrial oil export in history took place in 1847 at Bibi-Heybat, near Baku. By the late 19th century, the current azerbaijani Caspian coast, then integrated in the Russian Empire, was producing half of the world’s oil. Although its global importance declined over time, Azerbaijan experienced a new oil boom after gaining independence in the early 1990s. At the heart of this boom was the 1994 signing of the so-called “Contract of the Century” between then-President Heydar Aliyev (father of the current president) and thirteen oil companies (including AMOCO, BP, McDermott, UNOCAL, SOCAR, LUKOIL, Statoil, Exxon, Turkish Petrol, Pennzoil, Itochu, Remco, and Delta) for the joint exploration of deepwater reserves at Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli.
SOCAR, the sole Azerbaijani company among the signatories, was founded in 1992 as a state-owned monopoly. Since then, it has played a crucial role in developing the country’s hydrocarbon industry, from the exploration and extraction to the export of oil and gas on both domestic and international scales. SOCAR operates under the direct supervision of Azerbaijan’s head of state, who holds ultimate authority over its operations and appointments.
Close ties between the Aliyev family, SOCAR, and political institutions have been a constant feature. Azerbaijan’s current president, Ilham Aliyev, served as SOCAR’s vice president from 1994 to 2003. The current Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, Mukhtar Babayev, held various key roles within SOCAR over nearly three decades and now heads the COP 29 organizing committee—a committee that, somewhat paradoxically, includes SOCAR’s current president, Rovshan Najaf.
The substantial profits Azerbaijan gains from its oil and gas exports, especially to the EU, Israel, Turkey, and India, have enabled the country to fund a sovereign wealth fund known as SOFAZ, created in 1999. SOFAZ now holds assets worth $61 billion and plays a central role in Azerbaijan’s economy. Azerbaijan’s status as a petrostate limits its potential to lead by example in multilateral energy transition negotiations. The country embodies the paradox faced by states whose economies heavily depend on fossil fuels: pushing for a domestic transition would mean disconnecting from revenues essential to sustaining SOFAZ. Yet staying on the sidelines internationally could risk a decline in export revenue—a scenario that they may not be prepared to mitigate.
Azerbaijan’s dual position is notable. Despite holding the COP29 Presidency—implying leadership in climate negotiations—the country remains part of a small group of nations that has downgraded its climate goals (NDCs). This is an unusual move at a time when the relentless increase in global emissions demands more ambitious commitments. In September 2024, the independent scientific project Climate Action Tracker classified Azerbaijan’s climate actions as “critically insufficient.” This assessment highlighted, among other things, the government’s plans to increase gas extraction by over 30% in the coming decade and noted that emissions from Azerbaijan’s fossil fuel exports double its domestic emissions.
COP29 thus serves as a diplomatic showcase for Azerbaijan, while the country simultaneously renews assurance contracts with companies like British Petroleum (BP) and TotalEnergies and constructs new gas pipelines in the Caspian Sea. These moves underscore Azerbaijan’s balancing act between international climate commitments and its domestic fossil fuel-driven economic priorities.
Nagorno-Karabakh: the greenwashing of an ethnic cleansing
Hosting the 29th COP session in Baku makes Azerbaijan the first former Soviet republic to hold this globally significant event, following the rotational system according to which this edition should be held in a country from Eastern Europe or Russia. The decision was taken in December 2023 after Armenia withdrew its veto and candidacy to host the event in exchange for Azerbaijan’s release of 32 Armenian prisoners of war, while Armenia freed two Azerbaijani combatants. This arrangement was part of ongoing negotiations aimed at normalizing relations and resolving their historical dispute. The decision ended a long-standing deadlock caused by mutual vetoes between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, and those caused by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, with Moscow blocking Bulgaria’s EU-backed bid due to its support for Ukraine.
Despite this apparent agreement between Baku and Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s actions in recent years toward the Armenian-majority region of Nagorno-Karabakh have triggered strong international opposition to its selection as host of the world climate summit. Following a nine-month blockade that cut off Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population from essential supplies, Azerbaijan launched a swift military operation in September 2023, completing its occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and triggering the exodus of its 120,000 Armenian residents. This marked the final phase of the conquest initiated during the 2020 autumn war, bringing an end to a historical Armenian presence spanning over two millennia.
The ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population has been followed by a systematic population replacement, including the destruction of entire towns, and of neighborhoods in Stepanakert, the former capital of the now-defunct Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. This has extended to attacks on Armenian religious and architectural heritage, desecration of cemeteries, and erasure of the Armenian language and culture. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan continues to hold dozens of Armenian prisoners of war, including several former officials from Nagorno-Karabakh. Many have endured torture, and despite calls from international bodies for their release, Azerbaijani authorities have refused and are subjecting many to sham trials and long prison sentences. This is happening while Azerbaijani forces occupy some 215 square kilometers of Armenian territory, captured during several limited offensives over the past three years to pressure Yerevan into concessions in ongoing border negotiations, as well as to secure a transport corridor through southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, located between Turkey, Armenia, and Iran.
In what could be seen as a greenwashing operation to divert attention from the genocidal acts in Nagorno-Karabakh and shift Azerbaijan’s image away from being an oil-dependent state, Azerbaijani authorities have announced plans to transform the region into a “green energy zone,” with millions of USD invested in hydro, wind, and solar energy projects. This strategy benefits from the current absence of population across much of the territory, removing the need for land expropriations.
In a display of cynicism, the authoritarian regime led by Ilham Aliyev has called for a truce in conflict zones worldwide for the duration of COP29, with particular reference to Ukraine and the Middle East. These seemingly benevolent (and unrealistic) intentions contrast sharply with the bellicose rhetoric used to justify Azerbaijani military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, and overall against Armenia. In a December 2023 speech in Baku, Aliyev went as far as to defend the use of military force “to achieve peace,” portraying Azerbaijan as a model of success for other nations.
Repression and corruption in Azerbaijan: the hidden face of COP29
Azerbaijan ranks among the most authoritarian states in Europe, along with Belarus and Russia. It is placed 130th in the 2024 Democracy Index of 167 countries, elaborated by The Economist’s Intelligence Unit. Hosting the 29th UN Climate Change Summit is a key part of Azerbaijan’s strategy to improve its international image, even as it intensifies its authoritarian measures domestically.
Azerbaijani authorities have a long record of suppressing civil and political rights, including violently breaking up peaceful protests and using abusive legislation to shut down independent NGOs. This repression has intensified in the lead-up to COP29, with numerous cases over the past year of detentions and imprisonments of civil society members, climate activists, human rights defenders, academics, and journalists, as documented by humanitarian organizations under the umbrella of Human Rights Watch.
Freedom of expression and press freedom have suffered especially severely, as organizations like the World Organisation Against Torture have reported. In recent months, the authorities have closed independent media outlets like Abzas Media, Toplum TV, and Kanal 13, with many of their staff detained and held in pretrial detention. Of the 139 journalists currently imprisoned in Europe, 24 are in Azerbaijan, making it the third highest in Europe after Russia (58 journalists, including 28 in occupied Ukrainian territories) and Belarus (38).
This ongoing wave of repression, aimed at silencing internal criticism of the regime during COP29, also extends to corruption schemes linked to the event’s organization, including a $5.2 million contract awarded to Emin Agalarov, the president’s former son-in-law, for hosting COP29 participants at his Sea Breeze resort. This increased repression has led to a rise in the number of political prisoners in Azerbaijan to over 303, nearly triple the 122 held at the end of 2021.
Noteworthy among these prisoners are human rights and climate activists, such as Anar Mammadli, co-founder of the Climate Justice Initiative, a coalition created to monitor and expose irregularities during COP29. Mammadli was detained in April 2024 and remains in pretrial detention on charges of illegally bringing funds into the country, facing a possible eight-year prison sentence in a sham trial. His detention has been condemned by the UN Rapporteur on Climate Activists, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) rapporteurs on Azerbaijan, and various international human rights groups.
Azerbaijan’s tightening authoritarianism has coincided with a growing concentration of political and economic power around Ilham Aliyev and his family. In 2016, the office of vice president was created, and it has since been held by Aliyev’s wife, Mehriban Aliyeva. After winning the February 2024 presidential election, Aliyev inaugurated his fifth term, following elections held with no real opposition in which the central electoral commission awarded him 92% of the votes. This pattern of systematic rights violations led PACE to expel Azerbaijan in early 2024, with a vote of 76 in favor and 10 against.
Hydrocarbon exports and corruption schemes in Europe
One of the first leaders to congratulate Aliyev on his 2024 election victory was Charles Michel, President of the European Council. The EU’s double standards on human rights in comparison with other states in the eastern neighborhood like Belarus are notable. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Azerbaijan has become an increasingly important energy partner for the EU, given Europe’s need to reduce dependence on Russian gas, and the sanctions on Russian pipeline imports.
Since the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline opened in 2006, Azerbaijan has become a significant oil supplier to the EU. With the opening of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) in 2018 and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) in 2020, the country has also become an important natural gas supplier, especially for Italy. In July 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission signed an agreement with Azerbaijan to increase gas supplies to the EU to 20 billion cubic meters per year in the coming years. By the first quarter of 2024, Azerbaijan had become the EU’s fourth largest gas exporter via pipeline, behind Norway, Russia, and Algeria, supplying 7.7% of the block’s gas. Negotiations are ongoing to allow part of the expected increase to be transported through Ukraine’s pipeline system after the last contract for Russian gas transit to the EU expires at the end of 2024.
The massive revenues generated by state-owned hydrocarbons firm SOCAR have enabled Azerbaijan to buy political influence in Europe through corruption schemes to cover up its deteriorating human rights situation, part of its so-called “caviar diplomacy.” Notable cases include Pedro Agramunt, a former Spanish MP and former president of PACE, who resigned amid evidence of favors received from Azerbaijan. Another case involved former PDeCAT MP Jordi Xuclà, who was sanctioned by PACE in 2018 for his role in whitewashing electoral irregularities during a 2015 observation mission in Azerbaijan.
An uncertain start: COP29 agenda at stake?
The first task of the COP29 delegates will be to approve the agenda by consensus, which has been challenging in past years. The group of countries known as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), led by Beijing, has demanded a debate on what they call “protectionist”, “restrictive and unilateral” climate measures led by developed countries, which could delay the summit’s start. This request mainly targets the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), set to take full effect in 2026, which aims to tax carbon emissions embedded in emission-intensive goods such as steel or cement.
COP29 will also be held just a few days after Donald Trump’s electoral victory in the United States, who has repeatedly denied the very existence of climate change. Although he is not expected to attend the summit, it is worth recalling that during his first term, he withdrew the U.S. as a signatory of the Paris Agreement, and recently he announced he would do so again if re-elected as president. While the U.S. has not been characterized as a leader in diplomatic advances or domestic policy in this area, the consequences of his decisions could have a significant impact on the fight to mitigate climate change. Indeed, the news of his re-election will undoubtedly weigh heavily in the discussions and future agreements that will take place in Baku.
In this regard, the fact that recent editions of the COP have been held in countries with authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt, the UAE, and Azerbaijan, indicates not only a paradigm shift in the organization of these summits but also in the leadership of the climate agenda itself. This new multipolar scenario is driven by regional powers that, in many cases, have poor records on human rights and democracy, as well as questionable commitments to their transition towards decarbonization. Thus, COP29 not only reflects the growing asymmetries in the fight against climate change but also exemplifies the challenges arising from climate governance that, rather than being based on principles of cooperation and transparency, may increasingly be driven by regional geopolitical interests and divergent views on climate justice, equity, and shared responsibilities.
Abel Riu is the president of the CGI, specializing in Russia and the post-Soviet space.
Mercè Amich is a researcher in the Department of Quantitative Methods and a Ph.D. candidate in Finance and Quantitative Economics at UPV/EHU.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
