After the elections, geoeconomics will rule Turkey’s foreign policy
By Miquel Vila
12/05/2023
Main takeaways
Turkey’s economic constraints, rather than ideological priorities, will determine the foreign policy of the winner of Sunday’s election.
- Tensions with the West are set to ease. Even if Erdogan wins, he will have to take a more conciliatory approach towards the EU and in issues like Sweden’s accession to NATO. The EU represents 41.3% of Turkey’s total exports, worth $93 billion in 2021. Keeping this relationship is vital for the prospects of Turkey’s economy.
- Ankara will continue to look to Africa. Commercial exchanges between Turkey and African countries stand at around $34 billion annually, with growing prospects.
- Time to decrease military involvement. Turkey’s influence in the Middle East and North Africa has relied on its military assertiveness. Economic hardship might force any candidate to lower their commitment to the region.
- Turkey will keep playing as a bridge between Russia and the West. Turkey will continue to deepen economic ties with Russia, despite tensions between Putin and Kiliçdaroglu. After the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey became a safe haven for Russia’s investments, and trade volume reached $68.19 billion in 2022.
- The relationship with China has yet to deliver. Tensions with Beijing will likely increase due to the Uyghur question in the case of Kiliçdaroglu’s victory. However, if China offers economic opportunities to Turkey, the CHP will keep Erdogan’s conciliatory approach to Beijing.
Introduction
In the early years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan’s foreign policy closely followed the traditional approach that the Republic of Turkey had pursued since its establishment in 1923 under the Lausanne Treaty. Initially, Erdogan aimed to maintain “zero problems with neighbors” by implementing significant reforms to advance EU integration and enhance relations with Middle Eastern countries.
However, the early 2010s marked a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy. Factors such as the EU accession process stagnation and the Arab Spring created incentives for Turkey to adopt a more ambitious and assertive approach. To a certain extent, the global geopolitical shift that the world has experienced during the last decade has validated Erdogan’s pursuit of strategic autonomy.
In 2023, Turkey’s assertiveness has declined due to internal issues, including economic turmoil and rampant inflation that in 2022 reached 85% and with prospects of remain around 46% by the end of 2023. It is crucial to examine the evolution of Erdogan’s foreign policy and consider the prospects, particularly in light of his struggles to validate his mandate and the possibility of opposition coming to power. Understanding this evolution can help anticipate how Turkish foreign policy may evolve under either Recep Tayyip Erdogan or Kemal Kiliçdaroglu’s leadership. Nevertheless, regardless of who emerges victorious from the next elections, economic constraints will heavily influence most of their policy decisions to ensure that Turkey continues to benefit from the emerging multipolar geopolitical (dis)order.
Erdogan and the European Union
Since 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the EU has undergone some significant shifts and changes. Under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey initially pursued a policy of closer integration with the EU. In 2005, Turkey began negotiations for EU membership. However, progress towards accession has been slow, with a number of issues standing in the way of Turkey’s full membership in the EU. The accession process is currently stalled, with only one negotiation chapter closed and no visa-free agreement for Turkish nationals to enter the Schengen Area. One key issue has been the ongoing Cyprus conflict. Turkey has refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus, which has been a member of the EU since 2004, and this has created problems in negotiations with the EU. In addition, concerns over human rights and civil liberties in Turkey have also been an obstacle to EU membership. The EU has been critical of Turkey’s handling of issues such as press freedom, judicial independence, and minority rights. This has been particularly evident in recent years under the Erdogan government, which has expressed frustration with what it sees as the EU’s lack of commitment to Turkey’s accession. This is why Turkey’s foreign policy towards the EU became more confrontational at the beginning of the 2010s.
Despite this, Turkey has a strong geostrategic relevance for the EU in areas such as the control of migratory flows, control of commercial routes, and the relevance of its geographical position for the security of the continent. It is for this reason that, despite everything, Turkey continues to receive many funds from the EU via the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III). In addition, assertiveness in migration matters has also forced the EU to give Turkey financial resources worth more than 6 billion euros through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, which is the result of a 2016 deal under which Turkey agreed to take back migrants who had crossed into Europe from its territory. However, relations between Turkey and the EU have deteriorated since then, with Turkey accusing the EU of not providing enough financial support for refugees.
This has not been the only area of geopolitical relevance where Turkey has put pressure on the EU. In the Eastern Mediterranean, EU Member States Greece, and Cyprus have suffered aggressive rhetoric and action. This has been the result of the tensions generated by the lack of agreement on the delimitation of their Exclusive Economic Zones amid growing tensions around the issue of hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean when Cyprus discovered natural gas reserves in its waters, and Turkey objected to the exploration, citing its own territorial claims over the area. This led to a deterioration in relations between Turkey and Cyprus, as well as with Greece and other countries in the region, such as Israel and Egypt. The European Union also issued targeted sanctions in 2019 against Turkish entities and individuals linked to the illegal gas drillings in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, the response of individual Member States to this Turkish assertiveness has been divided. While France has strengthened its security partnership with Greeceand Cyprus, states such as Germany and Spain have maintained profitable bilateral relations, including in arms sales. Greece and Cyprus have also sought to counterbalance the power relations with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean by establishing security partnerships with Egypt and Israel while successfully excluding Turkey from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in alliance with these countries. The U.S. also increased its cooperation with Greece and Cyprus on security and defense issues, including the sale of F-16s to Greece and lifting an arms embargo on Cyprus.
Turkey’s economic situation, inflation, and unfavorable evolution of power dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean may force any future government to try to improve its relations with the European Union (EU). There seems to be significant consensus on this point between President Erdogan and the opposition. However, the opposition prioritizes a more ambitious improvement of the relationship with the EU to resolve issues such as improving the customs union -which is vital in light of the fact that the European Union accounts for 41.3% of total exports and 31.5% of total imports of Turkey-, reaching a visa agreement, or strengthening the funding received from the EU. However, an opposition victory would not lead to Turkey taking decisive steps towards EU integration. The reluctance on the part of the EU to join Turkey is not only determined by the factors that have been detailed above but also because of the fear of including a culturally different country. The large Turkish population -85 million people- would also give Turkey the largest number of members in the European Parliament and the capacity to easily articulate blocking minorities in the Council of the EU, especially in foreign policy matters on which Turkey is not currently fully aligned. Besides, underlying conflictual issues between Turkey and the EU, such as Cyprus or the militarization of the Greek islands, are unlikely to be addressed by the opposition in terms that are satisfactory enough for the EU.
Relations with the United States and NATO
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, it declared that Turkey would continue to maintain its strong ties with NATO. However, some tensions arose during this period, particularly in 2003 when Turkey refused to give permission for US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish soil. This created some strains in its relationship with NATO and the US. It was, nevertheless, from 2010 that the Turkish foreign policy towards NATO became more assertive. Turkey began to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy, cementing its position as a regional power and pushing for more influence within NATO. During this period, relations became more strained due to Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system in 2017. NATO and the US viewed this purchase as a threat to NATO’s security and issued sanctions on Turkey. The Turkish foreign policy also became more assertive and independent, as evidenced by its incursion into Syria in 2018, its intervention in Lybia to assist the Tripoli-based government in repelling General Khaftar’s forces from the Western part of the country in 2020, and its support of Azerbaijan in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war at the end of that same year.
The relationship between the United States and the YPG in Syrian Kurdistan has generated significant tensions between Ankara and Washington. Ankara views the YPG as a branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist organization, and has been critical of the U.S. support for the group in the fight against ISIS. This has strained relations between Turkey and the U.S., although the situation has cooled down on this front after the US withdrew from Syria.
The Kurdish question is also one of the points of friction that led Turkey to block Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession, with Turkey requesting the extraditions of alleged PKK members to Sweden as a condition for its ratification. Nevertheless, other intentions can be perceived in such blocking, such as the lifting of an arms embargo that both Nordic countries were upholding until recently against Turkey, as well as the selling of F-16s by the United States or the Turkish participation in the F-35 program.
The recent ratification of Finland’s NATO membership after it dropped its arms embargo on Turkey could mark the beginning of a more conciliatory approach, especially after such ratification entailed the selling of F-16 software by the United States and opened the door for eventual sales of new F-16s. If the bid of Sweden, which has also scrapped its arms embargo on Turkey and conceded the first extradition of an alleged PKK member, is ratified after the presidential election, the USA could make more concessions in return, and Turkey could correspond with a more cooperative dynamic. The likeliness of such a scenario would increase with a victory of the CHP-led coalition, given its more pro-western orientation and its potential capacity to regain the trust of Washington. However, in case of an AKP victory, the unfavorable evolution of Turkey’s geopolitical position on several fronts and its delicate economic situation could leave Erdogan no choice but to accept Sweden’s NATO membership and pursue a more cautious approach in the geostrategic vectors of its foreign policy that are more divergent from the USA and NATO.
Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman dream
Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East began to shift in response to the Arab Spring uprisings. Turkey was supportive of the uprisings and saw them as an opportunity to advance its geostrategic interests in the region, increase its influence and become a regional power. Turkey, in the framework of a closer ideological alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab World, actively supported the opposition movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria. Turkey also became increasingly critical of Israel, particularly following the Gaza conflict in 2008-2009. Turkey supported the opposition in the Syrian civil war and became increasingly involved in the conflict, eventually even launching military operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria.
In addition, Turkey became more confrontational with the Golf Cooperation Council – and especially with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. While at the beginning of the Arab Spring, confrontation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia remained limited, and the two countries shared similar interests in Syria, where both countries supported the opposition to the government of Bashar al-Assad. Things started to change following the 2013 Egyptian coup. Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries supported the military against the democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood, while Turkey opposed it and severed diplomatic relations with Egypt. In 2017, the GCC blockade against Qatar -a country with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood- also entailed a new line of confrontation between the CGG and Turkey, who took sides with Qatar and reinforced its security cooperation with this country. Then, in 2018, Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, which strained the relationship between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey accused Saudi Arabia of ordering the murder, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan criticized the Saudi government’s handling of the investigation, calling for an international investigation into the incident. In addition, the two countries have different stances on some regional issues, such as the conflict in Yemen, where Turkey supports a political solution while Saudi Arabia has been leading a military campaign against the Houthi rebels.
Recently, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a significant shift due to multiple fronts where Turkey has seen its position undermined. Turkey has encountered challenges in resuming diplomatic relations with Egypt due to difficulties with Egypt’s requests for the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey. Additionally, disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, including the signing of a bilateral agreement between Turkey and the Lybian Tripoli-based government on the demarcation of their Exclusive Economic Zones that Ankara is reluctant to scrap, have posed further challenges. Despite this, Turkey successfully resumed relations with Israel in 2022, which could lead to significant profits through the export of Israeli gas via their pipelines and could enhance their position with the United States. Turkey has also made progress in its relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, particularly after transferring the Khashoggi case to Saudi Arabia in exchange for resuming commercial relations that could benefit the Turkish economy.
Turkey’s neo-Ottoman policy towards the Middle East has not achieved its intended goals and has caused harm to Turkish economic and security interests in the region. An opposition victory could accelerate the correction of this policy, particularly in the full normalization of relations with Egypt. A Kiliçdaroglu-led government could help Turkey achieve its demands more easily, such as permanent restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities and a more nuanced approach to the conflict in Libya. In addition, this normalization effort will likely have to include Syria regardless of the winning candidate since the recent process of Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League will force Turkey to accept the continuation of the Baas regime led by Bashar Al-Assad. On this front, and given the inevitability of Al-Assad’s continuity, the great priority of the Turkish government, regardless of who leads it, will be to ensure that the status that is recognized for the Syrian Kurds after the Syrian civil war does not cross any red lines for its national security.
The construction of a pan-Turkic space
After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, its early foreign policy moves aimed to de-emphasize the country’s traditional ties to Europe and focus more on relationships with the Middle East and Islamic countries. This shift also included a greater emphasis on Turkey’s historical and cultural ties to the Turkic world, which had been underemphasized in earlier decades. Turkey began to pursue closer economic and political relationships with the countries of Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. This was part of a larger effort to re-establish Turkey’s status as a regional leader.
Turkey has sought to expand its economic partnerships with Turkic countries in recent years, including agreements on trade, investment, and energy. Turkish companies have also been active in investing in infrastructure and other projects in the region, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Direct investments in infrastructure in Azerbaijan and in the Turkic countries of Central Asia have been important in recent years, such as the investment in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line, a corridor that can connect Central Asia with European markets through the South Caucasus using the port of Alat as a link -another infrastructure that has received Turkish direct investment. Moreover, the post-Nagorno-Karabakh conflict scenario has favored the Nakhichevan Corridor project, which would provide Turkey with a direct corridor to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea through the Nakhichevan enclave.
However, it must be borne in mind that the leverage of China and Russia, both in Azerbaijan and in the Turkic countries of Central Asia, is more powerful. In fact, the only one of these countries that Turkey has as its main trading partner is Turkmenistan. Turkey proposes a strategy to increase its economic weight through the Turkish cultural sphere shared with these countries. Indeed, Turkey has invested more in cultural diplomacy in the Turkic world over the past decade, promoting its language, music, literature, and other arts. This has been an important part of its strategy to deepen connections with countries with which it shares a common culture and history.
The Russian military reverses on Ukraine’s battleground have widened the backlash of Central Asian countries against Russian influence in the region, as proved by the open criticism of the leaders of their leaders of invasion of Ukraine or the negative to align with Russia in UN votes on the conflict. This scenario allows Turkey to continue expanding its influence in the Turkic Central Asian countries, a course that a victory of the CHP-led opposition is unlikely to change.
The silent conquest of Africa
The Turkish foreign policy towards Africa has undergone significant changes. Erdogan’s administration embarked on a more ambitious foreign policy approach characterized by commercial and economic cooperation, aid and development assistance, and diplomatic ties. In 2005, Turkey became an observer member of the African Union (AU), established embassies in several African countries, and expanded to Africa the work of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which aims at providing development assistance to developing countries. Turkey’s economic expansion towards the African continent began in 2008 when it hosted the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul. During the summit, Turkey signed trade agreements and investment deals with African nations while also establishing a Turkey-Africa Business Council to enhance commercial ties with African countries and become a significant economic actor in the continent.
Turkey has intensified its commercial relations with Africa. President Erdogan has made more than thirty visits to African countries, has opened forty embassies on the continent, and Turkish Airlines has established up to fifty fixed air routes. Today, the volume of commercial exchange stands at around 34 billion dollars per year. Besides, Turkey has carried out massive investments in infrastructures of all kinds. For instance, it has financed the construction of an international airport in Niger -Turkish involvement in the Sahel is another major point of friction and geopolitical competition with France- and multiple railway lines in Ethiopia. The aim is to open new markets that provide investment opportunities for Turkish companies and make Turkey an exporting power.
Turkey is managing to present itself as an advantageous partner that imposes fewer conditionalities than the former European colonial powers or China. Many African countries buy this cover letter. A fundamental objective of this policy of trade openness in Africa is to reduce dependence on the EU, whose annual volume is ten times higher. In any case, Turkey is not yet in a position to compete with China, which invests hundreds of billions of dollars annually in the continent. Rather, the goal is to present itself as an alternative and gradually gain a sphere of influence in Africa, including by engaging in soft power diplomacy through the funding of cultural and educational institutions in Muslim countries on the ground.
The configuration of Turkey as a relevant geopolitical actor in Africa also builds upon a strong emphasis on security partnerships. In addition to the Turkish military assistance to the Tripoli-based Libyan government that prevented its collapse in front of the offensive led by General Khalifa Khaftar, Turkish has also signed memorandums of understanding with countries in the Sahel region -again, a major area of geopolitical competition in a traditional area of influence of France-, has established a military base in Somalia and has widely increased its arms sales to the continent.
It is unclear if the opposition would change Turkey’s current approach to Africa. Most likely, whether it is Erdogan or Kiliçdaroglu who is in charge, it will be the economic context that will dictate the future of Turkey’s African policy, depending on if Turkey’s influence in Africa reports enough trade surplus in the region.
Vladimir Putin, Erdogan’s “dear friend”
Since 2002, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia has undergone various changes and transformations. Initially, after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power, Turkey focused on building a strategic partnership with Russia. This was evident in its development of closer economic, political, and cultural ties with Russia. For instance, the two countries established the High-Level Cooperation Council in 2010 to boost cooperation in various sectors, such as energy, trade, and, despite its NATO membership, defense.
However, the relations between Turkey and Russia became strained in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Turkey, alongside many other Western countries, condemned Russia’s action. Turkey also began to criticize Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Syria and became increasingly concerned about Russia’s growing military presence in the region. This led to a dramatic deterioration in relations between the two countries. Tensions further escalated in 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that had violated its airspace. This incident led to a major rift in their bilateral relations, with Russia imposing economic sanctions on Turkey and suspending several cooperative projects.
Nevertheless, the relationship between Turkey and Russia began to improve in 2016 after several high-level meetings between their leaders, where Erdogan called Putin a “dear friend.” This culminated in the restoration of diplomatic relations and the lifting of sanctions by Russia in June 2016. Since then, the two countries have deepened their cooperation, particularly in areas such as defense – including the polemic purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system in 2017 despite Turkey’s NATO membership-, the Syrian crisis – the Astana process aimed at ending the Syrian conflict -, energy -Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant projects and the inauguration of the TurkStream Natural Gas Pipeline in 2020- and tourism – Russian tourists are the first among the tourists visiting Türkiye in recent years.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not prevented cooperation between Moscow and Ankara. While Turkey has supplied advanced weaponry to Ukraine, including Bayratkar drones, Erdogan has refused to align with the sanctions the West imposed on Russia and has maintained its economic partnership with this country. Indeed, Turkey’s trade relations with Russia have boomed after the war. Indeed, Turkey’s trade relations with Russia have boomed after the war. In 2022, Russia became the largest source of imports to Turkey, with a value worth $54.3 billion – total trade volume reached $68.19 billion in 2022. Additionally, it should be noted that Turkish imports from Russia have experienced a remarkable growth rate of nearly 300% over the past eight years.
After the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey saw a significant increase in Russian investments in 2022, with 1300 new firms and a 600% rise in investments. Despite the possibly situational nature of these figures, it seems that the Western sanctions regime will persist, potentially cementing Turkey’s status as a safe haven for Russian investments. Moreover, and due to its balanced approach to the conflict, Turkey has played an important role in mediating between Russia and Ukraine to guarantee the exports of much grain through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles strait, thus maximizing its geopolitical leverage in becoming a necessary partner to mitigate the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security.
Given all these elements, it seems likely that an opposition victory means that Turkey aspires to have sufficient strategic autonomy to maintain a good relationship with Russia to the extent that it brings significant economic benefits and strengthens its power in the international system. However, Kiliçdaroglu’s accusation against Russia of interference in Turkey’s elections already foresees a different tone in the relationship between Ankara and Moscow. It is very likely that the opposition will draw clearer red lines when venturing into areas of high strategic relevance that could damage the relationship with NATO, such as the acquisition of the S-400 missile systems. Likewise, the willingness to improve relations with the EU would also lead to greater caution on the part of a Turkish government led by the CHP, which should try to convince Brussels and its Member States that good relations with Russia are not a means for Putin to circumvent EU sanctions.
The Ambivalent Relation with China
Erdogan’s stance on China has been more ambiguous compared to his relationship with Russia. First, the rise of China has allowed to a certain extent, the rise of Erdogan. The US shift of attention towards China has created an opening in the Middle East, which Erdogan has used to increase Turkey’s influence in the region.
Second, in pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy in recent years, Erdogan has found an economic partner in China. In this fashion, Turkey joined the Belt and Road in 2015 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the country. Turkey’s strategic location as a bridge between Europe and Asia aimed to make its position an important partner for China’s main geo-economic initiative. Since then, Turkey has participated in several infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative, including constructing the Istanbul-Ankara high-speed railway and expanding the Kumport port in Istanbul.
In recent years, China and Turkey’s bilateral trade grew from US$1 billion in 2000 to US$32 billion in 2021. China became the top destination for Turkish imports until 2022 when Russia surpassed it due to the sanctions related to the war in Ukraine. In 2020, Chinese exports to Turkey were worth US$22.1 billion, including broadcasting equipment, computers, and non-retail synthetic filament yarn. Meanwhile, Turkish exports to China were valued at US$2.93 billion, with marble, travertine, and alabaster being the top traded products. Also, the arms trade in the last decade between both countries reached US$3.2 billion. Chinese investment in Turkey grew after Ankara’s access to the BRI, and although Turkey is not one of the principal locations for China’s FDI in the region, Chinese investments have targeted strategic sectors like energy, communications, and infrastructure.
On the other hand, Turkey also faces competition against Chinese products, especially in some industries at the lower ends of the supply chain. Indeed, Ankara counts on the present policy in Europe of being less dependent on China to benefit from practices of near-shoring. Beyond trade and investment, Erdogan has also aimed to move closer to Xi Jinping by seeking to make Turkey the first NATO member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a China-led security organization.
Third, despite Ankara’s and Beijing’s close economic ties, China-Turkey relations have been strained by the Uyghur issue, which has gained significant international attention due to allegations of Chinese repression against the Uyghurs. Turkey has a sizable Uyghur diaspora, and the Uyghurs are a Turkic people. Given Erdogan’s Neo-Ottoman foreign policy, which aims to establish himself as a champion of the Muslim world and make Turkey the center of a Pan-Turkic cultural sphere, we could expect that he had no choice but to confront China for its actions against the Uyghurs.
Nevertheless, Erdogan has taken an extremely balanced position in this matter – some even would argue that he has been conciliatory. In 2019, indeed, Erdogan publicly acknowledged that he did not want to harm relations with China by criticizing its treatment of Uyghurs. Here the economic imperative has made Erdogan take a cautious approach. And indeed, Erdogan’s position on the Uyghur question has been received with criticism by the opposition. Despite Erdogan’s low profile in this issue, the Uyghur question has been a point of conflict between China and Turkey when the government or other Turkish institutions have raised the issue in international forums and expressed concern about the situation in Xinjiang. In recent events, the Turkish government found itself in a diplomatic dispute with the Chinese ambassador over his reactions to remarks made by two opposition politicians, Meral Aksener, leader of the IYI Party, and Mansur Yavas, Ankara mayor and member of the CHP, who showed support for the Uyghurs.
China-Turkey relations face a fragile equilibrium, which means that the possibility of tensions escalating between Turkey and China over the Uyghur question if the CHP takes office cannot be ruled out. However, considering the current economic difficulties faced by Turkey, Kilicdaroglu may not have the luxury of jeopardizing the relationship with a vital economic partner like China.
Conclusions
With Erdogan in power, Turkey has developed an autonomous foreign policy that has put the country back in the game as a regional power with global reach. This has strained the relations between Ankara and Western capitals. We can assume that if Kilicdaroglu takes office, this fact will make it easier to improve relations with European countries and the US.
However, the economic situation might dictate more in shaping Turkey’s foreign policy than the political preferences of either candidate. In parallel, the economic imperative still would give incentives to a CHP-led government to look towards Russia and China. At the same time, Turkish influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia could generate important economic opportunities for the country regardless of who is in office.
In many cases, we could see a continuity of Erdogan’s foreign policy in those actions that have proved to be more useful for Turkey’s economy and geopolitical position.
Miquel Vila is the Executive Director of the CGI. He specializes in geopolitics and geoeconomics, and China and the Indo-Pacific region.
Daniel Roldán is the Editor in Chief of the CGI. He is a specialist in the European Union, the Middle East, and North Africa.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
