Elections in Germany: Electoral Shift Without Prospects for Change
21/02/2025
Nostalgia, they say, is a growing sentiment in cultural productions and even in political discourse. Indeed, in Germany, many may long for the days of bipartisan politics, when every four years, the choice was simply between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) as the traditional kingmaker. Over the past forty years, however, Germany’s party system has expanded to include new forces: The Greens, Die Linke—the result of the merger between the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Germany, and Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative (WASG), formed by trade unionists and disenchanted social democrats from West Germany—Alternative for Germany (AfD), and now, perhaps, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a breakaway from Die Linke that has been described as representative of a “nationalist left” or a form of “left-wing conservatism.”
It is evident that forming coalitions capable of implementing a governing program has become more complicated. However, countries such as Belgium or the Netherlands demonstrate that this challenge is not insurmountable per se. It is the electoral programs and the political climate that make coalition-building more difficult. And this is where Germany’s case generates uncertainty. Up to 83% of Germans report being “concerned” about the country’s situation in one of the latest surveys conducted by the federal public broadcaster (ARD). The structural problems of German society and economy have been accumulating for years, and in this past legislative period—driven in large part by international developments—they can no longer be ignored: the crisis of the German industrial model, underfunding of public infrastructure (an estimated 5,000 bridges require repair), Germany’s role in the European Union (EU) and international diplomacy. Added to these are stagnating growth, rising inflation, the housing crisis, and debates over immigration and so-called identity politics, which the far right has deliberately inflamed, knowing that it is fertile ground for its expansion.
These are the fourth early elections in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Voting intention polls have been consistent for months, projecting a clear victory for the CDU with around 30% of the vote. The SPD could suffer a significant decline from 25.7% in 2021 to around 15%, ceding second place to AfD, which could rise from 10.4% to 20% or even more if polls once again underestimate its voters. The far-right party has made immigration and security central themes of its campaign while also leveraging public concern over inflation. The Greens could tie with or come very close to the SPD, with 14% or 15% of the vote. At 4%, the FDP, which was part of the last governing coalition until the dismissal of its Finance Minister Christian Lindner, would fail to meet the 5% threshold needed to enter the Bundestag. Die Linke, which until a few weeks ago was struggling to reach 5% and had based its strategy on securing three direct mandates to ensure parliamentary representation, might manage to reach 6%. Meanwhile, BSW—which performed well in Thuringia (15.8%), Saxony (11.8%), and Brandenburg (13.5%) in the last electoral cycle—finds itself in a similar position to Die Linke a few weeks ago and, depending on which poll is consulted, may or may not enter the Bundestag. Die Linke hopes that BSW’s participation in the governing coalition in Thuringia with conservatives and social democrats will erode its image as a “protest party”—especially given the deep wounds left by years of internal tensions, which are only now beginning to heal—and that its alignment with the AfD and CDU in the January vote to toughen immigration policy will push undecided voters towards Die Linke instead.
Final results, of course, will not be known until the night of February 23, and some of the trends suggested by the polls may shift: the CDU may lose a few points while the AfD gains; Die Linke may drop slightly while BSW rises; the SPD may recover somewhat, improving its negotiating position. Another way to analyze the situation is that the combined vote of so-called “anti-system” forces (AfD, Die Linke, and BSW) now reaches or exceeds 30%—and even more if we include around 6% of voters who are expected to choose parties unlikely to gain parliamentary representation—meaning that over a third of the German electorate rejects, for various reasons, the current state of affairs.
The CDU Reigns, But Does Not Govern
Given the polls, no one doubts a conservative victory. The question is, with whom will they form a coalition government? The bitter experience of the so-called “traffic light coalition”—named for the colors representing the SPD (red), FDP (yellow), and Greens (green)—marked by constant public disagreements among partners, has led most parties to distrust coalitions involving more than two members. This leaves two main options: a coalition with the SPD (a grand coalition) or one with the Greens. Both formulas have been tested at the federal state (Land) and municipal levels, and in the case of the grand coalition, also at the federal level. Additionally, there has been speculation about incorporating a third party—either the SPD or the Greens—to provide greater stability, forming what is known as a “Kenya coalition”—named after the colors of Kenya’s flag, which match those of the CDU (black), SPD (red), and Greens (green)—which has precedents in Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg.
In any case, negotiations would not be easy. Friedrich Merz’s CDU is very different from Angela Merkel’s CDU. Some of the most evident frictions include the conservatives’ electoral program, which promises tax cuts and public support for businesses, while the SPD calls for higher taxes on top incomes and increased social investment. If the SPD enters a government coalition as a junior partner, it risks losing even more support in future elections, given its current polling around 15%. In the case of the Greens, despite the party’s centrist shift in recent years and its downplayed environmental agenda during this campaign, mutual distrust between conservatives and Greens remains strong—Bavaria’s Christian Social Union (CSU) leader Markus Söder has publicly stated his opposition to a coalition with the Greens. Moreover, key policy divergences exist on energy, immigration, and regulation. There is no federal precedent for such a coalition, and Austria’s experience does not inspire confidence among conservatives or Greens. Even Merz’s personal, political, and professional background—being a staunch conservative, a former BlackRock executive, and known for controversial statements—poses a challenge to coalition-building.
However, the real issue is that none of these options appears to offer anything new or effective solutions to Germany’s problems. Worse still, the governing coalition will likely be perceived as a compromise rather than a solution. A failure of any of these coalitions—especially a “Kenya coalition”—could further strengthen political extremes, particularly the far right. The breakdown of the cordon sanitaire against the far right in a January Bundestag vote on stricter immigration policies—granting more powers to federal police for deportations and introducing new hurdles for family reunification—sparked widespread public protest and criticism, including from Merkel. Observers question why Merz took this controversial step before the elections rather than afterward. The likely reason is twofold: to attract AfD voters and to keep the door open for future collaboration with them, or at least to use AfD as leverage against the SPD or Greens in the next legislative period. As Nathalie Tocci of the Italian think tank Istituto Affari Internazionali has noted, “When moderates dismiss cooperation with the radical right, voters know that choosing the far right is a wasted vote. But when they wink at the far right, that disincentive disappears, and voters tend to prefer the original to the copy.
Germany in 2030
If calling early elections is intended to clarify a political situation, this does not seem to be the case with this election. The modernization of German large industry has been one of the pending issues if the country wanted to maintain its international competitiveness. This task, which now most German parties claim to want to undertake—the CDU even speaks of an “Agenda 2030″—will have to be carried out in a much more adverse international context.
The “German model” based its growth on the export of manufactures on one hand, and on the stagnation of its own workers’ wages and insufficient investment in infrastructure and services on the other. Political analyst Wolfgang Münchau has argued in EuroIntelligence that the German economic system “is too dependent on manufacturing” and that “its political system never knew how to do anything better than feed it.” While this model worked well—largely at the expense of its neighbors—Germany was an “island of happiness” in the midst of a Europe in debt crisis. Solutions to the country’s pending problems—from greater agility in heavy local bureaucracy to digitalization, including greater public support for research and innovation, attracting international talent, or making its service sector more socially just—were being postponed. Angela Merkel’s (now not so) celebrated years were, to a large extent, exactly that, until in her final moments it began to show signs of exhaustion even before the pandemic due to changes in U.S. economic and foreign policy and China’s rise to becoming the primary economic power, and clearly accelerated in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline and sanctions on Russian energy have proven to be, as expected, a boomerang for the German economy in the short term. Russian natural gas has been gradually replaced by liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the USA: up to 91% of LNG imported through German regasification terminals came from the USA in 2025 (84% in 2023). Until Germany manages to diversify its energy imports, it can be said that the country has substituted one dependency relationship for another, not necessarily better one. Paradoxically, the import of U.S. LNG, which is extracted through hydraulic fracturing (fracking), with significant environmental consequences and must be transported by sea with a considerable ecological footprint, has received approval from a government formed, among others, by a party that claims to be environmentalist.
The increase in energy prices has had a direct impact on the country’s main industries, all of which require high energy consumption: machinery construction, chemicals, and automotive. The latter, moreover, is late to the replacement of the automotive fleet with electric vehicles, a market led by China. As a consequence of all this, Germany has lost international competitiveness, massive layoffs have been announced, along with relocations and factory closures—the only sector that has experienced clear economic growth is the arms industry: Germany has consecutively broken its own arms export record in recent years—and Germany’s international image itself, the “Made in Germany” label, has been damaged.
As a result, Germany’s international position and role in the EU has been affected. Indeed, a weakened Germany and a France with no less serious political and social problems mean that the traditional Franco-German axis that held the reins in the EU is losing strength without an alternative capable of replacing it, while governments of Eastern European countries and the Baltics exert pressure to prevent a resumption of diplomatic relations with Moscow. Donald Trump’s second term as U.S. president only makes Germany’s problems more urgent in view of the U.S. policy of imposing tariffs as an instrument of economic and political pressure that could trigger trade wars and significant limitations in international trade. The future German administration does not seem, at first, well prepared for all these challenges. Without yet knowing the exact results, but trusting in an increase in support that all polls reflect, the far right represented by AfD is already waiting for its failure.
Àngel Ferrero is a journalist and translator, and a regular contributor to Público, El Salto, and Catarsi magazine.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
