The ‘Clash of the Titans’: Any Firefighters Around?
27/10/2024
Background
When, on September 27, 2024, Israel assassinated the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, some thought that Tel Aviv would stop its military operation there. However, the Israeli army continued bombing the southern suburb of Lebanon’s capital, including targeting central Beirut three times and conducting airstrikes in eastern Lebanon and other areas. The Israeli government also announced its intention to invade southern Lebanon by bombing bordering towns and villages to create a buffer zone in the south. Finally, in a “message” to the Lebanese people, Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, warned Lebanon by providing its people with two options: either to disarm Hezbollah, which could trigger an internal civil war, or face the fate of Gaza as Israel would continue bombing Lebanon’s infrastructure.
What was the background of this war? On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah, a Lebanese paramilitary political organization known as the Islamic Resistance and supported by Iran, whose armed wing was designated as a terrorist organization by the EU in 2013, launched rockets on the Israeli-occupied territory of Lebanon—Shebaa Farms—to support Hamas in their fight against Israel after the “Aqsa Storm” operation. The situation on the Lebanese front was kept under control while Israel and Hezbollah had minor confrontations. This equation changed as of September 17, 2024. Starting on this date, Israel destroyed a significant part of Hezbollah’s communication means and assassinated its military leaders, including its Secretary-General. In ten days, Israel eliminated almost the entire Hezbollah leadership. Meanwhile, the Israeli army razed entire villages near the border, including the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing more than 2,000 civilians.
However, the ongoing war also has a regional dimension. Iran is the main supporter of Hezbollah, and as Israel started weakening its allies, it felt itself directly involved in this war. The escalation between Iran and Israel may trigger a regional conflict that would further destabilize the Middle East and neighboring regions. As Israeli officials started pushing for a narrative of a “change of regime” in Tehran and Israel assassinated the leader of Hamas in Tehran, Iran had no choice but to retaliate on October 1 by launching more than 200 missiles against Israeli military bases. Israel retaliated on October 26 by striking Iranian military targets and air defense systems in Iran. Moreover, Israel’s Prime Minister made clear that he wants to establish a “New Middle East” that challenges Iran’s and the “Axis of Resistance” (an alliance that includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis, and Iraqi militias) status quo. Thus, Israel’s war in Lebanon and Gaza is not only limited to the destruction of Hezbollah and Hamas but also aims to end the Palestinian issue by all means, which is the main source of legitimacy for the “Axis of Resistance” against Israel. To do so, Israel seeks to change the balance of power by force and bring back the U.S. to the region to contain or destroy the Iranian regime.
The following article will shed light on the regional dimension of the escalation by highlighting the positions of major regional and international actors, reflecting on a potential direct clash between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and proposing recommendations to de-escalate the tension.
Regional Dimension of the Escalation
Iran’s retaliation against Israel on October 1 gave a regional dimension to the conflict. As a result, the United States increased its involvement in the region, while Russia, China, and India adopted a “wait and see” approach.
Regarding the Middle East, the US and Israel share nearly identical interests. Washington sees Tel Aviv, along with partners like Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, as a strategic base to uphold control and connectivity between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The Americans encouraged the Indians to initiate the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), aiming to connect India to Europe via the Persian Gulf states and Israel. The significance of this corridor is to facilitate interconnectivity and normalize relations between Israel and some Arab countries. Although Washington is often portrayed as a trustworthy mediator, the United States is heavily intertwined with the Israeli agenda.
The EU’s position does not differ much from the US, though some EU countries condemned Israel’s aggression against Lebanese civilians and UN peacekeeping forces stationed in south Lebanon. Spain and Ireland took a firm stance against Israel, calling for a ceasefire. However, the EU’s inability to convince Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, along with Germany’s announcement to continue supplying Israel with arms, created frustration within many civil society groups and individuals or parties who previously opposed Hezbollah’s or Hamas’ policies in their countries. Despite the European states’ participation in UNIFIL and ongoing security and political involvement in Lebanon, the EU has not established itself as a successful diplomatic player in the conflict with Israel.
Meanwhile, Russia labeled Israel’s operations in Lebanon as acts of terrorism. However, Moscow made sure that Assad’s Syria does not intervene in the conflict, fearing destabilization in Syria as Moscow fights an “existential war” in Ukraine. Moscow also regards Lebanon “as an extension of its regional policy towards Syria.” Russia, however, ensures it maintains its balanced relations with both Israel and Iran. Iran is a crucial partner for Moscow regarding the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting Russia to India, and other Eurasian integration projects. Any political instability in Iran could cause security and sectarian tensions in the region, spreading to the Caucasus and Central Asia, areas Russia views as within its sphere of influence. While Russia maintains its alliance with Iran, it is unlikely to take direct action against Israel; instead, it may benefit from a “managed crisis.” A direct clash between Tel Aviv and Tehran would destabilize the Persian Gulf and increase oil prices. Such a scenario could also relieve pressure on Russia, as the West would be distracted from Ukraine.
China and India, two rising Asian players in the region, have balanced relations with both Iran and Israel. Similar to Russia, Iran plays an important bridging role for India regarding north-south connectivity. India recently increased its investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port. However, this did not prevent New Delhi from strengthening its military and security ties with Tel Aviv. Israel is also an important transit player for IMEC. Despite its strong financial and high-tech ties with Tel Aviv, China has taken a critical stance against Israel during the escalation of the conflict with Hezbollah. The increased tension poses a risk to the stability of the region and to China’s interests, as the Persian Gulf and the Middle East provide approximately half of China’s oil imports. Since China lacks the capacity to effectively mediate between Israel and Hezbollah, it seeks a reduction in American influence in the Middle East after the conflict to improve its own market opportunities in the region.
All these positions suggest that a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon is not on the horizon, and the war may be prolonged, potentially triggering a direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, ultimately adding fuel to the regional fire. As the world moves toward a multipolar system and a single power is unable to impose its will on others, grey zones are turning into war zones as both Iran and Israel prepare for a new stage of retaliation.
The Clash of the Titans
Is the ‘Clash of the Titans’ inevitable in the region? The situation quickly intensified as Iran fired ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1. Despite being more impactful than the April attack, the recent strike shows that Tehran wants to establish some level of deterrence against Israel while still keeping options open for further escalation. The purpose of the Iranian assault is to highlight the potential impact Tehran’s participation in a conflict could have on the region, likened to an “earthquake.” Simultaneously, Iran is seeking to avoid escalating tensions with Israel by using diplomatic means to pressure its main adversary and considering restarting nuclear talks with the US to help its struggling economy.
The Israeli cabinet decided to retaliate against the October 1 attack by Iran. Initially, it was rumored that Israel would bomb Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities; later, sources close to the US and Israel stated that the retaliation might be narrowed to IRGC-affiliated military targets in Iran. The decision regarding the Israeli response is based on the following arguments: first, there were doubts about whether the US would provide diplomatic cover if Israel targeted nuclear facilities; second, Israel could not utilize the US’s 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs, which limits its ability to destroy underground facilities; third, Israel lacks specific aircraft capable of transporting such bombs or refueling mid-flight. In preparation for this attack, the Americans deployed an anti-ballistic missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) as part of precautions for an Iranian response to the upcoming Israeli attack. Finally, on October 26, Israeli jets conducted “limited strikes” targeting military facilities. Iranian media downplayed the impact of the strikes. Moreover, Israel continued targeting Iran’s allies and, on October 16, assassinated the leader of Hamas and the perpetrator of the “Aqsa Storm” operation, Yahya Sinwar.
What May the ‘Clash of the Titans’ Between Iran and Israel Mean for the Middle East?
What’s Next for the Middle East?
The battles in southern Lebanon will once again shape the future of the Middle East. In 2006, Israel’s military defeat and subsequent withdrawal paved the way for a “Golden Era” for Iran in the region. Through its allies, mainly Hezbollah, Iran’s influence extended to Yemen and Syria. Now, Israel, backed by the US, is aiming to capitalize on the assassination of Hezbollah leaders and enforce an agreement on Lebanon that would serve its interests in the region. If Israel secures a military victory and Hezbollah acknowledges defeat, Tel Aviv would likely proceed to contain Iran and target Tehran’s assets in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Such a scenario would leave Iran isolated in the region and vulnerable domestically, potentially forcing Iran to utilize all its assets and directly clash with the US and Israel.
However, if Israel fails to defeat Hezbollah and a ceasefire is reached due to the Israeli army’s inability to push deeper into southern Lebanon, Hezbollah may leverage the war of attrition and declare itself victorious. This would further strengthen Iran’s position in the region and reduce US influence in the Levant and Persian Gulf. Such a scenario would be unacceptable to Israel, which may seek to prolong the war and increase American deployment in Israel to defend its interests in the region and protect against potential Iranian attacks. Consequently, the US may find itself increasingly involved in an Iranian-Israeli conflict.
In either case, the US is likely to become directly involved in the conflict. However, are there any “firefighters” around? The Biden administration seems either reluctant or ineffective in persuading Israel to agree to a ceasefire. If the US fails to extinguish the flames in the region, the entire Middle East could witness a regional war, with US interests becoming direct targets of Iranian retaliation. And if the Americans have decided to give Israel the “green light” to destroy Hezbollah, Lebanon will enter a dark period where Israel’s inability to defeat Hezbollah on the ground may drive certain political actors to ignite internal sectarian strife. For now, the Israeli strike on Iran presents two potential scenarios: either regional de-escalation, where conflicting parties enter negotiations and reach a compromise, or an escalation into a war of attrition, with no “firefighters” around to broker a ceasefire.
Yeghia Tashjian is the Regional and International Affairs Cluster Coordinator at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the CGI or its contributors. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
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Photo: An Israeli air force jet departs from an unknown location to attack Iran yesterday. (Israeli army/AP pic)
