Oman: the neutrality of a maritime empire
22/08/2026
The geography of a territory defines the character of the people who inhabit it and provides the framework that explains its history and, consequently, its politics. In the case of Oman, the descriptions offered by the media focus on its land position. For this reason, they emphasise that it is situated in a corner at the easternmost part of the Arabian Peninsula, as if it were encapsulated between the desert and the abyss of the sea.
However, Oman is not confined by its coastline. On the contrary, the sea has traditionally been the sultanate’s gateway to the world and its link to the wider world. The ocean has shaped the history and destiny of this territory even more than the dunes and mountains that separate it from the countries with which it shares a land border.
This has made Oman a peculiar Arab country that today stands out, among other things, for being a neutral nation in a region traditionally divided between two major power poles. On one side, the Saudis and their American and Israeli allies, and on the other, Iran.
For decades, Oman has emerged as a mediator in every crisis that has afflicted the region. The most recent example concerns the conflict between Israel and Iran, in which it has been one of the most active actors in persuading the Americans that war would benefit no one. Oman’s activism and peace initiatives on the diplomatic front in recent months stand in stark contrast to the attitude of its Arab Gulf neighbours, who left the sultanate to face the pressure alone to avert a war that has ultimately hit them hard.
The diverse approaches to regional conflicts, such as that in Iran, illustrate two ways of being and doing that are a direct consequence of history. On the one hand, there are the nations that owe their existence to the United Kingdom. On the other, Oman, a monarchy dating back to antiquity, is fully aware that it owes nothing to anyone.
The birth of a nation
The first Semitic peoples arrived in Oman thousands of years ago in two great waves of migration, drawn by its splendid geography and mild climate. Part of the population comes from Yemen, while the rest are originally from the north of the Arabian Peninsula. Although these events date back to ancient times, the tribal division based on the geographical origin of the ancestors persists to this day.
Oman offered newcomers everything a society needs to prosper. Above all, a long coastline and land ideal for agriculture. Its heirs today proudly assert that this variety—desert, sea and mountain—is the main reason for their people’s tolerant character.
In any case, it should be noted that long before the advent of Islam and the rise of its empire in the eighth century, Oman, together with Yemen, was the only territory on the peninsula organised as a state and ruled by a monarch. The social and political development of the region was a direct inheritance of its privileged geographical position, at a time when wealth came from the East via India.
In this context, the interest in possessing it by the great power that Portugal was at the time is understandable. In the midst of its struggle with its Dutch, British and French rivals for control of the sea routes — which simultaneously meant the control of the world — Portugal reached the gateway to the Persian Gulf in 1507, shortly after establishing its first protectorates in India. Within a couple of years, it dominated the entire coast and built a line of fortifications there, from the tip of the Arabian Peninsula to the Strait of Hormuz.
Portuguese occupation and repression drove the people to forge a resistance movement around a political and religious leader, whom the Arabs call an imam. Thus, in the conflict pitting Oman against Portugal, the Ibadhis chose, in the mid-17th century, Nasir bin Murshid as the imam and the father of a new dynasty of rulers.
At this point, it should be recalled that the majority of Oman’s population adheres to the Ibadi branch of Islam, which does not recognise the lineage of the leaders of the Sunni world, who from the seventh century until the twentieth century lived in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul. Nor does it coincide with the Shiites, who believe that the community’s leader must be a direct descendant of Muhammad. For the Ibadhis, any worthy Muslim can lead the community.
The religious particularities of Ibadhism and the fact that it is a very small branch of Islam have kept them, since the Middle Ages on the sidelines of the struggles for power and leadership in the Islamic world, which is one of the characteristics of the rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites, between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The other characteristic of Omani society was its eminently seafaring nature. It lived off the sea, and the sea was its home, as demonstrated by the fundamental role played by the so-called ‘frogmen’ in the struggle against the Portuguese colonisers. The men in charge of launching the maritime guerrilla attacks and setting fire to foreign vessels were the self-sacrificing pearl divers, one of the pillars of the local economy, who could hold their breath underwater for up to two minutes, equipped only with a weight belt and a nose clip.
The birth of a maritime empire
The new leader of Oman was an ambitious man who placed blind faith in the military strength of the tribal coalition that had freed them. He was not content with merely recovering Omani territory. For this reason, he devised an expansion strategy that consisted of replacing the Portuguese in their possessions on the eastern coast of Africa. The imam’s gamble was a complete success.
In any case, Oman was not an alien presence in the Zanzibar region. Since the eighth century it had maintained a presence through the spice trade and, above all, the slave trade, which for centuries was the empire’s main source of revenue. The novelty is that, with the creation of the new fleet and the plans for military expansion, Oman went from being an element of the African landscape to taking control of it.
The powerful Omani navy secures the expansion of its trade and establishes itself as the master and lord of the Indian Ocean. It even extends its dominion along the entire African coast, from present-day Somalia to Mozambique. As for the Persian Gulf, the imams extend their influence to present-day Bahrain and Qatar. This, in addition to their presence in some ports of Balochistan in present-day Pakistan and India. In fact, the physical appearance of a large part of the Omani population, of darker skin than their Arab Gulf neighbours, is a reminder of Oman’s secular ties with Zanzibar, the Gwadar region of Balochistan and India.
The relationship with Baluchistan was particularly intense. Traditionally, the sultans have supplied their troops with Baluchis, the descendants of whom make up more than 20% of Oman’s population. The extensive Baluchi presence in Oman should come as no surprise, since the political link with that territory was not broken until 1958, when the sultanate sold Gwadar to Pakistan for three million dollars.
The situation of territorial expansion in Africa and the resulting economic growth begins to unravel following an internal political crisis. In 1718 the imam of the time died, and a dispute over succession broke out. Let us recall that the founder of the dynasty had been able to bring together the various tribes because they were united in their fight against the Portuguese occupation. But that external threat, which had kept them united, had long since vanished.
The confrontation between the leaders escalated into a civil war. At its core, it was a violent resurgence of the age-old rivalry between the tribes that had come from Yemen on one side and those from northern Arabia on the other.
The latter sought external support and allied themselves with the Iranian neighbours. The Shah sends troops there without delay. But the Persians, who were keen to expand their domains as a countermeasure to Ottoman expansion in the region, instead of assisting their ally, occupied the country in 1737.
The birth of a new dynasty
As we know, history tends to repeat itself. In the case at hand, the various factions of Oman are once again uniting against the occupation, this time by Iran. Just as in the case of the expulsion of the Portuguese, the victory gives rise to a new leader and a new dynasty of rulers, who, from now on, will be called sultans. Since then, the Bu Said family has ruled the country.
Nevertheless, the new leader did not enjoy a placid reign. Tribal rivalry resurfaced, and the families settled on the shore of the Persian Gulf revolted. This region, then known as the Omani coast and later as the Trucial States, is now the territory of the United Arab Emirates.
Parallel to this, in a process reminiscent of the Portuguese passage through the region two centuries earlier, the British set foot in India. At that moment, London realised the importance of the Arabian Sea region in protecting its interests on the subcontinent. Immediately, it prepared a major offensive to eliminate the last threat to its ships and maritime trade in general. The aim was to put an end to the pirates’ activities, who were taking refuge on the rebel coast of Oman.
At this point, the interests of London and Muscat converge, and they ally. The former aimed to sink the pirate fleet. The latter to regain control of the unruly tribes. But once the war ends in 1820, the British exploit their position of strength to weaken the Omani maritime empire. They refuse to cede control of the Omani coast to them and only recognise the authority of the local sheikhs, the descendants of whom will found the United Arab Emirates in 1971 under the auspices of the United Kingdom.
Once the Persian Gulf coast was lost, Oman focused its commercial and political efforts on the Indian Ocean, to the point of declaring Zanzibar the co-capital of the sultanate. At that time, Oman was still a regional power, as evidenced by the fact that controlling an area at 4,000 kilometres from Arabia would not have been possible without maintaining a considerable naval force.
The birth of a puppet state
As in Oman’s previous eras of splendour, the 19th-century period of expansion came to an abrupt end due to a succession struggle. London once again intervened in Oman’s political life to settle a dispute between two of the sultan’s sons. It does so with a solution that primarily benefits British interests in the region.
Two decisions are taken that have terrible consequences for the sultanate’s economy. On the one hand, Oman is separated from Zanzibar, and each son is granted a share of the empire. On the other, the United Kingdom bans the slave trade. As a result, Oman becomes impoverished in a very short time, and tribal conflicts soon reappear. Economic decline and the prevailing political circumstances ultimately led to Oman being made a British protectorate in 1891.
The terms of each agreement signed with London limit the room for manoeuvre of local leaders and worsen the country’s situation. To the point that Sultan Taymur bin Faissal, who in 1913 inherited a country with countless internal tensions and entirely dependent on the British, abdicates the throne in favour of his son and goes to live abroad. Finally, the British dismantled the maritime empire that had been the undisputed master of the region for centuries. The only one that could rival them in the Indian Ocean.
Sultan Said bin Taymur, who succeeded his father in 1932, became a caricature of a leader. Completely controlled by the British, he focused his rule on restricting his subjects’ freedoms to unsuspectedly absurd extremes. He banned, among other things, sunglasses, umbrellas, air conditioning, films, gatherings of more than three people and talking to someone on the street for more than fifteen minutes. He also imposes a border closure. Anyone wishing to import a bicycle or leave the country must apply in person.
Until the 1970s, the clock of progress in Oman stood still, the country isolating itself from the world and from the chronology of the twentieth century. One example of this sudden disconnection: for decades, the country had only the ten kilometres of paved road it had inherited at the start of the century.
During the reign of Taymur, the country faced two fairly significant conflicts that were resolved by the decisive military intervention of the British and their ally, the Shah of Persia. On the one hand, the Jebel Akhdar War (1954–1959), fought by the tribes of the mountainous region near Muscat, traditionally opposed to the sultan. The second, more significant internationally, is the Dhofar War (1962–1975), which transformed the national claim of the inhabitants of the region bordering Yemen into a nationwide communist battle.
In Dhofar, the inhabitants are Sunnis; Ibadi Islam is not practised there, and many of them speak a Semitic language different from Arabic, one that is related to the languages of Eritrea and Ethiopia. The British and the air force of the Shah of Persia, then the main Western ally in the region, crushed the Dhofar rebellion and its calls for a communist revolution without mercy.
Because of armed conflicts and the sultan’s obsession with protecting his subjects from foreign cultural influences, Oman spent much of the twentieth century isolated from the world and progress. The state of Oman existed in name only, but the day-to-day running of the country was directed and decided by the British.
However, Taymur’s grotesque view of the world and his complete inability to govern ended up becoming a nuisance. The change in attitude towards the sultan was probably conditioned by the discovery of the first oil reserves in the 1960s, and the British deemed it opportune to update the country’s power structure. For this reason, in 1970, London orchestrated a coup d’état in favour of the sultan’s son, Qaboos, who had received academic and military training in the United Kingdom.
The birth of a modern state
Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman returns to the international stage and becomes, overnight, a modern state. This was at a time when its commercial and military power in the Indian Ocean was anything but a memory. The new sultan finds a Middle East divided between supporters and allies of Saudi Arabia and Israel on the one hand and Iran on the other. In this scenario, and in order to play a part again on the world stage and ensure economic progress and the security of its borders, Oman decides not to take sides in regional disputes.
Let us recall that Oman’s Ibadi nature has placed the sultanate’s interests between two poles of Islamic power alien to its own version of Islam. On the other side of the desert lies Sunni Arabia. On the opposite shore is Shi’ite Persia. Probably for this reason, contemporary Omanis are a people inclined to keep a balance. Thus, Qaboos decides to strike deals with everyone and not to make enemies of anyone.
In this way, the sultan establishes neutrality and cordiality with all its neighbours as the founding principle of the new Oman, offering itself as a mediator in the conflicts that have long plagued the region. This has allowed it to host US military bases on its territory while maintaining cordial relations and military cooperation agreements with Iran. To the point that in 2024, the two armies conducted a joint military exercise.
Oman has always maintained a close relationship with Iran, largely to counter the influence and threat of its large land neighbour, Saudi Arabia. As for the Persians, they have never had any reason to become enemies. They do not regard the Sultanate as a rival nor as a threat in any sense.
Oman adopted the same policy of neutrality regarding Syria. During the war, it did not support any sanctions against the Damascus regime at a time when it was being strangled by an international blockade and its Arab neighbours were funding all manner of guerrillas to topple President Bashar al-Assad.
One of the few instances in which Oman has taken sides in the interest of its national interest is in the war in Yemen. Muscat has supported the Houthis, allies of Iran, some of whose leaders live in Oman. This is a source of tension with Riyadh. However, it is also a bargaining chip against Arabia and a guarantee that Yemen’s future will not be decided without the sultanate’s involvement.
As for the Palestinian conflict, Oman maintains ties with both sides. It has not signed the Abraham Accords to normalise relations with Israel, but it receives Hebrew ministers in Masqat with full honours. On the one hand, it is relaxed with the Israelis, while on the other it calls for the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.
The rebirth of a maritime power
The 2026 war between Israel and Iran has brought the fragility of the Strait of Hormuz to the attention of the general public. But regional actors have long been seeking alternatives to this waterway, which is between fifty and ninety kilometres wide and through which more than 20% of the world’s oil passes.
In this context, the Omani coast of the Indian Ocean has regained its role as a strategic region of bygone eras. The ports of Duqm and Sohar –the former on the Arabian Sea, the latter on the Gulf of Oman– have received generous Saudi investments to turn them into an alternative entry and exit route for hydrocarbons and goods to the Persian Gulf.
In other words, the Strait of Hormuz crisis has made Oman’s ports a first-rate strategic hub for regional trade. All of this makes the sultanate an attractive country for everyone. China, like the Saudis, is also investing in upgrading this alternative port system to the Gulf’s terminals. For its part, the only way the United States has found to offset Chinese presence and influence in the region has been to invest more in Oman. However, Trump’s presidency has temporarily altered this dynamic.
Future challenges
The economic development since Qaboos took the reins of the country is undeniable. But while the economy has grown, freedoms have not grown to the same extent. Money and political stability have allowed the Sultan to remain in power as an autocrat. To the point that Qaboos came to concentrate the offices of head of state, prime minister, and ministers of defence, the interior, and finance.
Unlike in previous eras, the death in 2020 of Sultan Qaboos, the great transformer and father of modern Oman, did not cause any upheaval, nor did it involve any substantial change in the country’s political course. His cousin Haitham has maintained neutrality abroad and absolute power at home. Omanis continue to have only a symbolic role in decision-making and in influencing the government. Corruption is part of the political landscape; the administration is not held accountable, and neither criticism nor dissent is tolerated.
In a country that must maintain a balance between different tribes and unruly regions, the discretionary distribution of power and wealth has been a way of defusing their protests. This has made corruption a means of governing. This state of affairs has been sustainable as long as the people remembered the privations of the twentieth century. But the new generations have grown up in an economically prosperous country and are demanding improvements in other areas.
It is not difficult to find press articles and think-tank papers describing Oman as a ‘peaceful oasis’, in contrast to its neighbours, afflicted by all manner of calamities. However, the country’s situation is by no means idyllic. In fact, protests occur periodically for various reasons.
At first, the regime is not in jeopardy because the people are not calling for revolution, as the communist movements of the 1970s proclaimed. They are merely demanding an end to corruption and political reform. But all signs point to the government having to take more profound measures to prevent popular discontent from spreading.
Oman was not immune to the winds of change that swept through the region between 2011 and 2018. At that time, the regional and domestic context brought to light grievances that had accumulated over the years. Workers in the industrial zones demanded economic reforms with particular force, intellectuals in the capital asked for political opening, and the middle class called for social reforms.
The regime reacted, albeit timidly, and implemented some legislative reforms, such as raising the minimum wage and limiting the number of foreign workers—60% of the workforce—in order to offer more professional opportunities to the native population. In any case, the government clearly distinguished between economic progress and freedom. It made concessions on financial measures. But it repressed those who demanded social and democratic change.
One of the groups most severely punished by Masqat in this respect has been the Xihuh tribe, the only one on the coast of the Truce States in the Persian Gulf, which at the time remained loyal to the Omani government and refused to join the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, the Xihuh maintain a tense relationship with the regime, which has even gone so far as to ban some of their cultural practices and the use of their dialect. For this reason, many of Oman’s pro-human rights voices and activists are from this region.
At a national level, one of the recurring issues raised by critical voices is the discontent of young people due to the lack of job opportunities. All this has led the authorities to accelerate plans to leave behind the hydrocarbon era, which accounts for nearly half of GDP. After all, Oman’s great challenge, like that of the entire region, is to diversify its economy to facilitate the transition to a future with less dependence on oil. Crude oil reserves are estimated to be exhausted in fifteen years and gas reserves in eighteen.
In this context, the government presented an economic diversification plan in 2020 called ‘Vision 2040’, which is reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’ or the UAE’s ‘We the UAE 2031’.
One of the pillars of the project is tourism. Certainly, in just a few years, Oman has become a well-known destination worldwide. In any case, the revenue generated by visitors complements the major business linked to the logistics of the Indian Ocean ports.
The ‘Vision 2040’ strategy, which aims to relaunch the country’s economy, has also served to restore the state’s historic relations with Africa, which were broken during the British colonial era. Among other initiatives, Oman has made significant investments in the Zanzibar archipelago and has become Tanzania’s third-largest investor, after the United States and Kenya.
Muscat is also aiming for one of the other territories it had partially come to control in the past. With India, it has signed defence agreements that will allow New Delhi to benefit from the brand-new ports built in the Arabian Sea. In addition, an oil pipeline has been planned to link Iran and India via Oman.
For centuries, Oman was the centre of a maritime empire that stretched from Zanzibar to the Persian Gulf. But, due to colonial power and internal battles, it abruptly closed itself off from the world. When it emerged from the bubble to which Sultan Taymur had condemned it, it did so via the traditional maritime routes. Routes that had connected Oman with Africa and India since time immemorial.
The return to the international stage has also taken place within the framework of a vision and alliances conditioned by the Ibadi nature of the majority of Omanis. Their religious affiliation has made them a cautious people who must strike a balance between two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which represent two branches of Islam and political interests that arose from certain conditions that, precisely, are not shared among the Omanis.
Jordi Llaonart is an Arabist and journalist. He was formerly a press correspondent in the Persian Gulf and the author of the book ‘Viatge al cor de l’islam’. La història política dels xiïtes i els llocs sagrats del Pròxim Orient’ (Pagès Editors)
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They do not represent the views and opinions of the CGI or its collaborators. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of the material therein do not imply any expression of opinion whatsoever on the part of the CGI concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory, its authorities or concerning the delimitation of its borders.
